State Cooperation on Regulatory Policies for Transboundary Environmental Issues by Pennell, Jennifer Lyn
Portland State University 
PDXScholar 
Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses 
7-6-1995 
State Cooperation on Regulatory Policies for 
Transboundary Environmental Issues 
Jennifer Lyn Pennell 
Portland State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Pennell, Jennifer Lyn, "State Cooperation on Regulatory Policies for Transboundary Environmental Issues" 
(1995). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 4937. 
10.15760/etd.6813 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and 
Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu. 
THESIS APPROVAL 
The abstract and thesis of Jennifer Lyn Pennell for the Master of Science in Political 
Science were presented July 6, 1995, and accepted by the thesis committee and the 
department. 
COMMIITEE APPROVALS: 
DEPARTMENT APPROVAL: 
  
Representative o 
Studies 
unn 
e Office of Graduate 
ry L. Scott, Chair 
epartment of Political Science 
***************************************************************** 
ACCEPTED FOR PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY BY THE LIBRARY 
on /9 ~J:i:&~±::= /99s 
ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Jennifer Lyn Pennell for the Master of Science in 
Political Science, presented July 6th, 1995. 
Title: State Cooperation on Regulatory Policies for Transboundary Environmental 
Issues 
This research analyzes three contributing factors, perception, knowledge, and 
affordability, in order to estimate the likelihood of state cooperation on effective 
regulatory policies for transboundary environmental problems. The correlative 
hypothesis in this research postulates that states are more likely to support 
environmental regulatory policies when the issue is perceived by policymakers as 
serious, substantiated by a high level of knowledge, and affordable for the state. 
Regulatory policies for transboundary environmental issues require policymakers to 
act in foresight, employ precautionary measures, and cooperate. Cooperation implies 
that states will coordinate their policies and eschew their dominant strategy of 
independent decision making. However, this research contends that states decide to 
cooperate because they perceive the strategic interaction to be beneficial. Thus, the 
theory of cooperation in this research is consistent with realist assumptions of 
rational egoism. 
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Chapter One: Research Project Overview 
Abstract 
This research analyzes three contributing factors, perception, knowledge, and 
affordability, in order to estimate the likelihood of state cooperation on effective 
regulatory policies for transboundary environmental problems. The correlative 
hypothesis in this research postulates that states are more likely to support 
environmental regulatory policies when the issue is perceived by policymakers as 
serious, substantiated by a high level of knowledge, and affordable for the state. 
Regulatory policies for transboundary environmental issues require policymakers to 
act in foresight, employ precautionary measures, and cooperate. Cooperation implies 
that states will coordinate their policies and eschew their dominant strategy of 
independent decision making. However, this research contends that states decide to 
cooperate because they perceive the strategic interaction to be beneficial. Thus, the 
theory of cooperation in this research is consistent with realist assumptions of 
rational egoism. 
Introduction 
The world is on history's most rapid growth track. A sudden 
acceleration of events on several interrelated fronts - the economic, the 
ecological, and the political - has combined to compel profound 
changes both in the relationships between peoples, nations, and 
governments, and in the way we view and think about the management 
of the planet as a whole.1 
The end of the century ushers in a new era of ecological awareness and 
environmental correctness. Although environmental issues predate this "heightened 
consciousness" considerably, only recently have they begun to be treated seriously by 
policymakers and international relations scholars. Today, many governments 
acknowledge the grave prospects of a degraded environment, while still others 
continue to subordinate environmental concerns to political and economic interests. 
Either way, governments no longer have the luxury of ignoring environmental issues 
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altogether; issues ranging from transboundary air pollution to a depleted ozone layer, 
acid rain, and global warming are commanding the attention of states. 
The Research Method 
The intent of this research is to deepen the understanding of state 
cooperation on transboundary environmental issues. This research examines two 
anthropogenically caused environmental problems, ozone depletion resulting from 
the global production of clorofluorocarbons ("CFCs"), and nuclear accident spills that 
occur as a result of human mismanagement. Using these two environmental issues 
as case studies, this research looks at the following contributing conditions: 
perception, knowledge, and affordability, and makes the correlative hypothesis2 that 
states are more likely to support environmental regulatory policies to decelerate 
practices that deplete the ozone, and protect against and prepare for nuclear spills, 
when: 
(1) policymakers' cognition of the problem is keen (i.e. there is a perception 
of threat); 
(2) policymakers possess a high degree of knowledge on the issue (mostly 
provided to them from the scientific community); and, 
(3) the state can afford the enactment of environmental regulations to the 
extent that other economic and political issues can be subordinated to address 
the environmental problem. 
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The Research Questions 
Given the many states' poor record regarding environmental issues, and many 
other states' still delinquent practices, this research asks the questions: Why do 
certain states actively support environmental protection policy for the stratospheric 
ozone? Why do certain states actively submit to International Atomic Energy 
Agency ("IAEA") regulations for the peaceful use of nuclear energy? The central 
question is why participating states decided it was important to enact regulatory 
policies regarding the ozone and nuclear energy. Did certain conditions, such as the 
perception of a crisis, present themselves? Was there a high degree of knowledge 
generated by the scientific community and provided to policymakers? Were certain 
enticements involved, or accommodations offered, to states that influenced the 
affordability factor? 
The Cases for Analysis and Comparability 
Two case studies will be used for analysis: (1) The environmental problem of 
stratospheric ozone depletion and the treaty, The Montreal Protocol on Substances 
That Deplete the Ozone, 3 produced to decelerate this process by limiting the global 
production of CFCs, (2) The threat to the environment and human health resulting 
from nuclear energy disasters and the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear 
Accident ("Notification Convention") and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of 
a Nuclear Accident ("Assistance Convention") under the auspices of the International 
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Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA") that have the purpose of minimizing the 
"transboundary environmental health and economic consequences of a nuclear 
disaster."4 The issues are similar in that neither ultraviolet radiation nor nuclear 
radiation can be seen, and both types of radiation are potentially disastrous to 
human health and to the environment. Beyond these fundamental similarities, the 
issues are distinct. These two case studies have been chosen for this research 
precisely because the perception of threat, degree of knowledge, and affordability 
factor manifest themselves at different levels for these two diverse issues. To 
intimate at the research to follow, below is a brief discussion, of the two case studies 
in reference to the three contributing factors, perception, knowledge, and affordability, 
that may have the effect of either motivating states to, or discouraging states from, 
enacting regulatory policy. 
Perception and Knowledge 
Acting as surrogates for the state, policymakers are required to negotiate 
policy in many different realms. Concerns regarding the degradation and 
conservation of the environment pose new challenges to them because in effect they 
are being asked to make decisions in areas of inexpertise. Knowledge is valuable in 
discussing environmental problems and many issues like ozone depletion, 
biodiversity, and global warming depend largely on scientific data to "validate" their 
existence. Moreover, in the absence of a crisis, perception of threat is negligible. 
Seldom has the existence of a crisis been manifest in environmental issues that 
J .L. Pennell - Page 5 
exhibit a more progressive, evolutionary character. Therefore, information becomes 
very important as scientists from around the world, as well as agencies like the 
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
substantiate data. Today, owing to the knowledge generated by the scientific 
community, the majority of societies around the world agree ozone depletion is 
harmful. Thus, the perceived seriousness of ozone depletion is derived from the 
information generated on the issue. 
Perception and knowledge, as structural variants, are manifest differently in an 
analysis of nuclear energy regulatory policy. Nuclear energy provides a duel 
perception. Fear of a major nuclear accident leads to the perception of peril, 
whereas nuclear energy as a viable energy source carries the perception of promise. 
As perilous, the perception of a nuclear disaster is unmatched by any other 
environmental problem; a nuclear accident presents a certifiable and imminent crisis 
perceivable by all individuals, not just those with a high level of scientific knowledge. 
Nuclear energy also carries the perception of promise. The number of states 
working to produce nuclear programs is proliferating at great speed. Because 
perceptions surrounding the nuclear energy issue are so strong, knowledge, a structural 
variant, may not have to be as high as in the case of the ozone. Verifiable scientific 
data on nuclear disasters may not be necessary to persuade policymakers to enact 
regulatory policy because the perception of threat is sufficient to this end. Thus, 
while the perception that nuclear accidents are serious is not enough to keep states 
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from exploiting nuclear power as a viable energy source, it may be enough to induce 
states to submit to regulatory measures, such as the inspection, reporting, 
notification, and information provisions required under the IAEA regulations. Thus, 
while many states are willing to "take the risk," so to speak, in using nuclear energy, 
they are also willing to \;omply with safeguards that aim to protect their own citizenry 
as well as neighboring states. At present, 82 states are party to the Notification and 
Assistance Conventions ranging from the regions of Africa, Latin America, the 
Middle East, Asia and Pacific, and North America. Table I illustrates the levels of 
perception and knowledge manifest in the environmental issues ozone depletion and 
nuclear energy use. 
Table I 
Perceived Threat and Knowledge 
/////////////II/// Ozone Nuclear Energy 
Knowledge HIGH Perceived seriousness is 
already derived (possibly 
from fear) and therefore 
the value of knowledge is 
minimized. 
Perceptwn Perceived seriousness HIGH 
depends on a HIGH level 
of knowledge. 
-
Affordability Factor Amidst Competing Interests. 
The third factor, affordability, refers to the states' ability to bear the cost of 
certain regulations. Wealth refers to a state's abundance of resources, possessions, 
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and capabilities: any capital that can be turned into money. To afford something, on 
the other hand, refers to the ability to bear the cost without a serious detriment. 
Thus, the affordability factor is similar to the "opportunity cost" (a term widely used 
in economics) that is the cost of making an investment that is the difference between 
the return on one investment and the return on the alternative. Thus, to afford 
something is to make a choice between competing interests in a justifiable manner. 
For less-developed states, the choices begin with economic growth (and 
related concerns: unemployment, trade deficit, cost of living/inflation, cost of 
borrowing/interest rates, recession/depression, and budgetary issues). Moreover, a 
developing state struggles against issues of dependency on the first world, as well as 
deals with precarious and erratic internal politics. Ultimately, developing states have 
more pressing interests which they desire to cultivate before (or more than) 
environmental protection. In short, they want to develop, and efforts aimed at 
protecting the environment offer very little to the achievement of this goal. For 
industrialized countries, there are many competing political and economic interests 
prevalent in a democratic, market economy. Faced with imminent issues such as 
drugs, crime, education, poverty, and of course, the economy, policies for the 
environment are often overlooked. Thus, while industrial states may have the wealth 
to enact regulatory policy, they may not be able to bear the cost. 
Many states (developing and industrial) decided that they could afford to 
enact regulatory policy to ameliorate the ozone depletion problem. Once committed, 
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the industrial states provided incentive for the developing states, such as allowing for 
a ten year grace period for the implementation of control measures, for special 
financing to assist the developing countries, and for the transfer of technology to 
developing countries "under fair and most favourable conditions. "5 
States also justified the cost of signing the Notification and Assistance 
Conventions for peaceful use of nuclear energy perhaps for a few different reasons. 
First, submitting to inspections, agreeing to report information, and notifying an 
agency when an accident occurs, does not "cost" a state a great deal. Clearly, these 
provisions are not analogous to the costs associated with some environmental 
problems that require states to forego economic gains in favor of protecting the 
environment. Second, there is no such thing as a nuclear "accident-prone" state. 
Nuclear accidents can happen anywhere, in any state. Three Mile Island reminds us 
that mismanagement can occur even in the most advanced states. The Conventions 
thus resemble an "insurance policy."6 The insurance policy description is apt 
because states do not know how a severe nuclear accident would effect them. As 
Young points out, participants to the Conventions are in a contractarian position 
similar to Rawls's original position.7 (The original position illustrates a situation 
where actors are assigned the task of devising civil society ignorant of the attributes 
they will possess. The result, therefore, is a society based on equal treatment to all 
individuals.) Similarly, in the nuclear accident situation, states have general 
knowledge that a disaster would be widespread and long-lasting, severe, and quite 
possibly transboundary. They however, do not know which state will be the source, 
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when or where an accident will occur. Many states, therefore, have chosen to bear 
the cost associated with submitting to safeguards to avoid this potentially devastating 
fate. Table II serves as a visual analysis of the three contributing factors perception, 
knowledge, and affordability in reference to ozone depletion and nuclear energy use. 
Table II 
Perceived Threat, Knowledge, and Affordability 
////////I// I////// Ozone Nuclear Energy 
Knowledge HIGH - Based largely on Perceived seriousness is 
scientific data already derived (possibly 
from fear) and therefore 
the value of knowledge is 
minimized. 
Perception Perceived seriousness HIGH - Based largely on 
depends on a HIGH level memories of Chernobyl 
of knowledge. 
Affordability HIGH degree of HIGH degree of 
affordability based on affordability based on 
available substitutes, states' rational calculation 
financial and technical that submission to 
assistance, and equitable safeguards was a 
accommodations. reasonable expense 
compared to the 
devastating effects 
resulting from a major 
nuclear accident. 
Conclusion - The Direction of the Paper 
The intent of this paper is to deepen the understanding of state cooperation 
on transboundary environmental issues. The first part of the paper is general in that 
the analysis is not specifically concentrated on environmental issues. However, the 
research conducted in this part of the paper is necessary in studying environmental 
issues because it provides a theoretical framework that is essential to a 
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issues because it provides a theoretical framework that is essential to a 
comprehensive analysis. Moreover, because there are varying theoretical frameworks 
to choose from, it is necessary to make clear which one is utilized in this research. 
Thus, for reasons that will be made clear below, Chapter Two situates the analysis 
in a realist paradigm, explains what is meant by political realism, and argues that 
realism is the most effective theoretical model for studying international 
environmental issues. 
Because there are also competing views about how state cooperation comes 
about, Chapter III discusses two conditions, JUture relations and common interest, as 
explanatory elements for policy coordination that are consistent with a realist 
paradigm. Thus, Cooperation becomes more likely when states perceive themselves 
as having future relations, or shared interests, with some other state(s). Chapter 
Three sets forth the key elements of cooperation theory and emphasizes regime 
formation and reciprocity as important mechanisms for cooperation when states 
perceive future relationships and shared interests with some other states(s). The 
reader will be keen to notice that reciprocity is most effective for bi-lateral, short-
term exchanges whereas regime formation is particularly useful in confronting issues 
that are long-term and involve multiple states. As transboundary environmental 
issues are often of this variety, this research employs a specific version of regime 
theory that is consistent with realism to explain why states coordinate their policies 
to confront a shared environmental threat. Regime theory is also a useful context 
within which to analyze the structural variants, perception, knowledge, and 
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affordability. 
In Part Two of this research, specific environmental issues are introduced. 
In Chapter Four, the issue of ozone depletion and The Montreal Protocol on 
Substances That Deplete the Ozone is submitted into the analysis. The Protocol is 
examined in reference to the three contributing factors that may enhance an 
environmental issue's likelihood of gaining regulatory policy. That is, the research 
examines whether states' policymakers perceived a high degree of cognition 
(perception of threat), knowledge, and affordability in making policy decisions for the 
protection of the ozone. In Chapter Five, the issue of peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy is discussed in reference to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear 
Accident ("Notification Convention") and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of 
a Nuclear Accident ("Assistance Convention") implemented under the 
intergovernmental organization the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA"). 
The three contributing factors, perception, knowledge and affordability, are applied to 
this issue as well. 
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Chapter Two: 
Sovereign States, Transboundary Issues, and Political Realism 
SECTION I - ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES, PAST AND PRESENT 
Introduction 
For most governments, the prevailing approach for environmental issues has 
been reactive rather than proactive,9 perhaps attributable to two causes. First, the 
uncertainty surrounding so many environmental issues contributes to the 
complacency on behalf of policymakers. Policymakers are reluctant to act based on 
speculation, skepticism, and unsubstantiated data. Moreover, their willingness to 
advocate policy in areas of inexpertise is negligible. McCormick explains that 
policymakers are slow to act due to " ... a simple lack of understanding about the 
causes and consequences of environmental problems and their long-term cost."10 
As such, the information generated by scientific communities is of fundamental 
importance to environmental solutions, especially when scientists around the world 
corroborate findings on the same issue and report them to the policymakers. An 
increase in knowledge lessens uncertainty. The salience of the issue, as well as its 
evidential gravity, become manifest in light of verified data. 
Second, as policymakers are often myopically focused on short-term goals, 
they seldom look beyond their immediate milieu to take seriously the deleterious 
effects endemic to a neglected environment. It is antithetical to a policymaker's 
position to adopt a long-term perspective and act in a preventive manner when there 
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1s a wealth of issues demanding immediate attention. The probability that 
policymakers will risk their reputation, as well as dip into the state's budget, to guard 
against, for example, global warming - an issue heretofore not clearly understood -
is negligible.11 As such, environmental protection policy is subordinated to short-
term economic and political interests. Thus, a state's, via its policymakers', 
perception of the problem is of fundamental significance to its solution. 
Change in Perception 
Some states' "reactive" environmental practices of the past are changing. For 
example, the United States has spearheaded many environmental regimes and its 
efforts have been paramount to enacting significant environmental protection 
policy.12 This behavioral change may be attributed to three factors. First, the 
reconfigured Post Cold-War state system may be conducive to cooperative efforts 
that heretofore were futile in a bi-polar system. Some argue Cold War policymakers 
viewed world politics in zero-sum terms; what was believed to be good for the United 
States was bad for the Soviet Union, and vice versa. Deutsch explains: 
Any step toward moderation, mutual accommodation, or compromise 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, or between the 
United States and Communist China, on any subject matter, so the 
'true believers' in the Cold War on both sides think, is nothing but the 
futile appeasement of an insatiable enemy, and a treasonable sacrifice 
of the interest of one's own nation13 
Second, some contemporary scholars writing on the international system 
suggest that the sense of stability following World War II is eroding, and that purely 
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"power-seeking" techniques are ineffectual.14 As such, these scholars argue, a larger 
emphasis should be placed on mechanisms for keeping order. Examples of 
mechanisms for keeping order may include the utilization of international (and non-
governmental) organizations, international law, and the participation in regimes. (A 
regime, thus defined, is not a material entity like an organization or agency, but 
rather an institutionalized arrangement used to structure state interaction.) Scholars 
who subscribe to this belief argue that order seeking mechanisms produce a better 
outcome for egoists, in situations where a desired result can be better achieved 
through the pursuit of order rather than power. Thus, these non-state instruments 
are channels for policy coordination, and while they do not, in and of themselves, 
promote cooperation, may facilitate it. As such, environmental issues may be more 
likely to capture the attention of states, and governments may be more willing to 
protect the environment, in an international system structure amenable to order. 
Third, and related to the second, is the proliferation of non-state actors, 
ranging from international organizations (IGO's) to non-governmental organizations 
(NGO's), social movements/interest groups, and regimes, that facilitate cooperative 
efforts of the environmental variety by making the issue known and increasing 
communication and information amongst states. Members of the international 
scientific community, for example, share information, support and/or reject findings, 
and act as advisors to the state. An increase in knowledge on a particular issue may 
influence states to advocate environmental protection policy. As Deutsch explains: 
Men want 'cognitive consonance' in what they know, as well as in what 
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they want. They wish their world to make sense, to add up to 
something meaningful and manageable, or at least tolerable, whole. In 
this desire for cognitive consonance they suppress or reject items of 
information that do not fit into their image of the world; or they may 
seek, consciously or unconsciously, for some simplified image of the 
world that will seem clear, understandable, and consonant to them, 
and that will relieve their feelings of disorientation, frustration, 
alienation, and anxiety.15 
If "Men" are the policymakers who desire cognitive consonance then non-state actors 
may be important, especially when these non-state actors are able to explain an issue 
to policymakers in a manner which "fits into their image of the world." Thus, 
knowledge and perception as structural variants are significant to policymaking. 
Sovereign States, Transboundary Issues 
International environmental protection policy is a fascinating phenomenon to 
study for several reasons. First, environmental issues are generally transboundary 
in nature. (Some practices more than others. Nuclear testing, for example, is 
transboundary par excellence, while polluting a local lake remains an isolated problem 
only for its territory.) Nonetheless, there are many practices that degrade the 
environment in one state and affect other states (mostly its neighboring state), 
through the inevitability of air and water flow. As Wenner explains, "pollutants 
recognize no national boundaries. "16 Thus, policies that restrict the degrading 
action are weak (if not futile) when adhered to only by certain states. 
Seccnd, environmental protection requires policymakers to act in foresight 
because the deleterious effects of certain activities cannot always be seen 
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immediately. For example, ozone depletion may not seem as serious as it is because 
it does not directly affect our everyday life in ways that can be easily perceived. 
Conversely, issues that are visibly and tangibly manifest, such as poverty, crime, and 
homelessness, ethnic conflict, trade barriers, and political unrest, command obvious 
attention from policymakers. Thus, environmental problems are intractably political 
as states are asked to act before the problem reaches crisis status. Accordingly, 
environmental policymaking is not as simple and straightforward as would be implied 
by leaders making decisions with complete information on the basis of a rational 
choice.17 Instead, decision making is burdened by uncertainty and a multitude of 
variables. State A may have to pay the short-term opportunity cost of economic gain 
if it decides to enact long-term environmental protection policy on a certain issue-
area. As such, State A runs a risk of receiving a sub-optimal outcome. Such a 
strategy is antithetical to a policymaker's position as the most rational strategy for 
a state is the one most likely to produce the winning outcome, and avoid the losing 
one.18 
Third, because environmental degradation is ofttimes irreversible, 
policymakers must adopt an intergenerational perspective and act in a precautionary 
manner, before the damaging action reaches a "crisis" level. An environmental crisis 
can be defined as a situation in which a previously tolerable set of circumstances is 
suddenly, by the addition of another factor, rendered wholly intolerable. 
Undoubtedly, an environmental crisis has the effect of catalyzing environmental 
regulation, as in the case of Chernobyl that led to the nuclear accident regime under 
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the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency.19 However, every crisis 
has its beginnings Jong before the actual onset. This is true of most environmental 
problems, where a catastrophic outcome may be the result of what seem historically 
to be benign practices that are, in reality, progressively destructive to the 
environment. Ultimately, "[m Jan's activities affect the whole Earth and bad 
unintended consequences can stem from actions deemed harmless at the time they 
were begun."20 Most environmental problems are not analogous to Chernobyl and 
thus the "apparent importance of crises ... bodes poorly for problems of a more 
gradual and cumulative nature."21 For example, the loss of global biodiversity, the 
destruction of the Amazonia rainforest, and global warming are three areas of the 
environment that are being irreversibly degraded at a rapid pace, yet have not 
attracted the attention of governments sufficiently to enact regulatory policy. 
Lastly, because states are sovereign, the probability of creating a "global" 
solution to the environmental crisis is negligible. Philosophical reasoning tells us that 
the atmosphere, for example, is part of the global commons or heritage of 
humankind. In order to avoid a tragedy of the commons22 an international 
approach that calls for the governing of the atmosphere is needed. As Hurrell and 
Kingsbury explain: 
Collective environmental management poses a severe, and therefore 
politically sensitive, challenge because it involves the creation of rules 
and institutions that embody notions of shared responsibilities and 
shared duties,... and that seek to embody some notion of common 
good for the planet as a whole. 23 
Thus a contradiction exists as sovereign states are called upon to enact policies that 
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may have the effect of undermining their primacy in international affairs. This 
incongruity is probably most poignantly reflected in Principle 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration of the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment that 
declares: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies and the responsibility 
to ensure that environmental activities within their jurisdiction or control do 
not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction. 24 
The first part of the principle pronounces the right of sovereign states to exploit their 
resources while the second part assigns environmental responsibility, resulting in a 
contradictory position for the state. As such, a state's political agenda, and economic 
goals based on exploitation of their natural resources, often seek to fulfill interests 
opposed to global environmental concerns. The problem is exacerbated by the fact 
that some states will accede to certain regulations, yet others will not. (Not all, but 
some issues require several states to change their behavior in order for regulatory 
policy to be effective. In these situations, non-participating states can significantly 
hinder the effectiveness of cooperative environmental policy.25) Thus, the problem 
is compounded when not only one, but many sovereign states, are required to forego 
economic and political goals to protect the environment. The issue of state 
sovereignty and transboundary environmental issues is addressed in theoretical form 
in Section II - Political Realism, below. 
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SECTION II - POLITICAL REALISM 
Environmental Issues in a Realist Paradigm 
In an international system of sovereign states that has a propensity for conflict 
over cooperation, how do transboundary environmental issues attract policymaking 
attention? Not only do the issues require states to possibly forego other economic 
and political concerns, but they also call for the coordinated effort of many states. 
Denying economic growth and eschewing its dominant strategy of independent 
decision-making argues against the nature of the state. Writing on this topic in the 
early 1970's Richard Falk commented: 
A world of sovereign states is unable to cope with endangered-planet 
problems. Each government is mainly concerned with the pursuit of 
national goals. These goals are defined in relation to economic growth, 
political stability, and international prestige. The political logic of 
nationalism generates a system of international relations that is 
dominated by conflict and competition. Such a system exhibits only a 
modest capacity for international co-operation and co-ordination. The 
distribution of power and authority, as well as the organization of 
human effort, is overwhelmingly guided by the selfish drives of 
nations.26 
An analysis sympathetic to Falk's comment bodes poorly for environmental 
protection efforts, and consequently, a formidable contradiction exists between a 
state's sovereign right to pursue socio-economic affluence and ecological 
interdependence. In Hurrell and Kingbury's words, cooperation is impeded because 
of: 
the striking dichotomy between the seamless web of ecological 
interdependence on the one hand and the fragmentation of the 
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international political system on the other. A single, complex and 
highly integrated ecosystem has to be managed within the constraints 
of a political system made up of over 170 states, each claiming 
sovereign authority within its territory.27 
Although a "striking dichotomy" exists between national sovereignty and the 
global nature of environmental issues, the state system has not proven to be as rigid 
as described by Falk more than twenty years ago; the ominous prophecy on the ill-
fate of the environment has only partially been fulfilled, with much cooperative 
progress being made. As such, many scholars who once viewed the state system in 
a purely realist paradigm have altered their thinking to remark on the significance 
of non-state actors as instruments of the state system that have the purpose of 
maintaining order and managing states' many interdependencies. 28 
Correspondingly, these authors argue, with a minimum of posturing, that cooperation 
is not only possible in such a state configuration, but also desirable because often the 
use of non-state actors leads to a better outcome than unilateral action. This Section 
examines the origins of the realist school and its tenets, then looks to modified 
versions of realism as the supersession of the classical doctrine. The resultant sub-
paradigm used in this research remains consistent with tenets of realism, while 
allowing for cooperative efforts for the environment. Environmental issues often 
need to be confronted by multiple states, calling for a concerted effort. However, 
because it is in each state's best interest to submit to the coordinate policy, the tenets 
of realism are not violated. Moreover, the sub-paradigm utilized in this research is 
amenable to testing the correlative hypothesis using the three contributing factors, 
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perception, knowledge, and affordability. 
Classical Realism 
Classical Realism tracing back through Hobbes and Machiavelli to 
Thucydides, asserts that states are the primary actors in the international system. 
These primary actors are rational and therefore employ a cost/benefit calculation in 
decision making. Moreover, states seek power as a means to achieving an end (or as 
an end in itself). The Hobbesian state of nature is one in which a state's actions 
must be based on the capabilities of themselves and other states. Thus, states "must 
begin from the assumption that other states' capabilities may someday be used 
against them."29 The Hobbesian realist holds that the state must protect its citizenry 
from external aggression and thus must assume a perpetual state of war. 30 
Waltz, following Morganthau, reinforces these principles of realism delineating 
concepts of security, rationality, and balance of power. However, Waltz's neorealism 
is distinguished from Morganthau's classical realism in that Morganthau defined 
rational behavior as the accumulation of power as an end in itself, whereas Waltz 
believes that power is a political means for attaining other ends.31 Waltz contends 
that a state's most crucial concern is for security.32 Thus, states have an innate 
motivation to ensure the security of their citizenry, not an innate lust for power. 
Consequently, anarchy stems more from the drive for security than the drive for 
power. However, as Axelrod points out, in protecting their own security, states may 
challenge other states' security.33 Waltz explains that states in anarchy cannot all 
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be secure at the same time; the same force that ensures security for one state may 
endanger others.34 
Moreover, Waltz's neorealism is different from classical realism in that 
classical realism attributes the unidirectional nature of the causes that individuals and 
states produce to the outcomes of their actions while neorealism looks to the 
structure of the system and its interacting units to explain international politics. 
Thus, by focusing on systemic levels of analysis that emphasize structural laws in the 
state system, neorealism rejects the belief that the individual is motivated only by 
power and that such motivation is sufficient cause for all actions, including war. 
Accordingly, the structural (or neo) realism of Waltz looks at unit-level and 
structural-level causes that make up the international system. For example, in a 
bipolar world as between the United States and the former Soviet Union, each side 
focused on the fears of the other and acted according to their perceptions.35 
Perception, as a structural variant used in this research, is important for 
understanding the reasons behind policy decisions. This research accepts the 
structural-level analysis of Waltz, however, there are others in the current literature 
that suggests that neither Classical Realism nor Waltz's Neorealism are sufficient for 
analyzing the world system, and "that it is necessary to find some means of 
reconciling the hermeneutic and the structuralist traditions."36 Because it is 
important that the reader be familiar with competing theoretical frameworks, three 
frequently used paradigms to analyze state behavior, liberalism, idealism, and post-
Waltz realism, are described below. 
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Liberalism 
The realist makes the assumption that order is the result of state competition 
because conflict is pervasive and omnipresent.37 In contrast, liberals perceive 
cooperation as the overarching norm of the state system. The liberal agrees that the 
international system lacks a common authority and that states are sovereign. 
However, the liberal refrains from the "anarchy" metaphor because the term 
connotes chaos and conflict. 38 Instead, "unregulated" more accurately depicts the 
nature of the state system.39 Moreover, the liberal's assumption of a cooperative 
environment is not premised on benevolent, altruistic, or naive reasons; rather, the 
liberal perceives the state system as analogous to a market economy based on 
notions of laissez faire and rational goals of mutually-rewarding exchange. The 
liberal believes that cooperative relations are a natural consequence resulting from 
self-interested rationality. However, for the realist, the laissez faire analogy does not 
focus on the most important aspect of cooperation which is state interaction. Stein 
for example, disagrees with the market analogy arguing that "if the international 
environment were like a marketplace, nation-states would confront generalized 
contexts (market conditions) but not other leaders or other states."40 
The idealist espouses a more utopian vision of the international system than 
the liberal or the realist. Idealism is normatively based on how the world should be 
rather than how the world is. This is the underlying and fundamental distinction that 
separates realism and liberalism from idealism. The idealist advocates authoritative 
rules for all states; the eradication of the state is advocated by either creating a world 
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government or through the promotion of grassroots approaches to interest 
representation. However, the idealist approach finds hardship in a realist state 
system, as there is little feasibility in settling disputes authoritatively. Theories lose 
efficacy that require nations to surrender sovereignty. Ultimately, the goals of 
idealism are sometimes inconsistent with the reality of the international system. 
Environmentalists often err on the side of idealism; they often advocate policies that 
are benevolent and generous but also not feasible. A simple test to prove this point 
would be to analyze the three structural factors, perception, knowledge, and 
affordability, under the theoretic framework of idealistic environmentalism. The 
analyst examining the three factors under this framework would have to ignore or 
adjust the findings to fit into his hypothesis. Environmentalists often ignore the 
affordability factor by advocating policies that place the earth's sustainability above 
other competing economic and political issues. Hopeful of striking an emotional 
chord in listeners, environmental advocates often use hyperbolic rhetoric in place of 
substantiated knowledge. Moreover, perception of threat, is often exaggerated by 
environmentalists. Some environmental advocates believe that "conservation" efforts 
are not enough and that the "preservation" of all environmental resources is called 
for. In advocating extreme view such as these, and ignoring competing approaches 
to problem solving, the environmentalists' plea often loses efficacy. That is, 
environmentalists who fail to exercise objectivity in choosing their issues, and operate 
from the assumption that the "sky is falling," will ultimately lack effect in advocating 
an issue in which the sky is really falling. Thus, to "cry wolf' too many times will 
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ultimately be detrimental to the environmentalists' cause. Hence, by using the three 
factors, it is clear that not all issues provide the same level of salience to 
policymakers. For these reasons, idealism does not provide a viable theoretical 
model for analyzing environmental issues. 
Post-Waltz Realism 
Presently, the preponderance of literature shies from the extremities of 
steadfast realism and utopian idealism. Most scholars today take a middle road, 
acknowledging the presence, as well as the significance, of non-state actors. These 
authors vary in perspective - some claim that non-state actors have transcended state 
sovereignty, while others claim that non-state actors supplement the state and thus 
co-exist in the state system. 
Keohane's position is illustrative of this middle road. Keohane maintains that 
cooperation, as an active policy pursuit, requires institutions to reduce uncertainty 
and facilitate in information communication. Arguably, Keohane's assertion that 
institutions are significant, challenges the classical realism doctrine based on the 
primacy of the state. However, Keohane argues that his conception of institutions 
remain within the bounds of realism. He professes: 
My 'outside-in' perspective is therefore similar to that of systemic 
forms of Realist theory, or 'structural realism.' What distinguishes my 
argument from structural Realism is my emphasis on the effects of 
international institutions and practices of state behavior.41 
Keohane emphasizes non-state actors, intergovernmental organizations, and 
transnational and transgovernmental relations as mechanisms that facilitate the flow 
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and access of information amongst states, and thus criticizes Waltz's structural 
analysis as inadequate for accommodating change.42 Keohane believes Waltz's 
structural neorealism refers to "its intellectual affinity with the classical realism of 
Morgenthau and Herz and its elements of originality and distinctiveness."43 The 
originality refers to Waltz's focus on systemic levels of analysis that emphasize 
structural laws in the state system. Ultimately, Keohane argues, Waltz's systemic 
theory is inflexible to change because it treats "internal attributes of actors as given 
by assumption rather than treated as variables."44 
Thus, Waltz's realism asserts that states must rely on "the means they can 
generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves."45 But, Keohane 
observes that if the world system was really a state of war as described by Waltz, 
there would be no institutionalized forms of cooperation based on shared interests, 
except as a further means to enhance power. Therefore, Keohane's theory 
(originating from the Institutionalist tradition) argues that cooperation "can under 
some conditions develop on the basis of complementary interests, and that 
institutions, broadly defined, affect the patterns of cooperation that emerge."46 
Hence, Keohane situates his theory in a realist foundation of rational egoism, 
emphasizes rationality,47 and asserts that cooperation can be fostered by 
institutional arrangements. Keohane argues that institutions facilitate cooperation 
not because they impose authoritative rules, but because they make possible a 
context amenable to cooperation. Keohane argues that Realist egoism (the 
implication that actors in world politics are self-seeking and act in their own welfare) 
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is consistent with forming institutional forms of cooperation. Thus Keohane finds 
structural realism insufficient in that it predicts behavior based on power and self-
interest alone. He believes that institutions are helpful to analyze not only power, 
but "shared interests, and prevailing expectations and practices."48 Thus Keohane 
supplements, rather than rejects structural realism of Waltz, by emphasizing the 
"effects of international institutions and practices on state behavior."49 In sum, 
international institutions and practices are needed to facilitate cooperation. 
Ultimately, Keohane's theory offers a middle ground that softens realism without 
erring on the side of idealism. 
Similar to Keohane's position on institutions is Rosenau's perspective. 
Rosenau employs the term bifurcation of world politics to describe the phenomenon 
of the traditionally state-centric system now co-existing with " ... an equally powerful, 
though more decentralized, multi-centric system," dominated by nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and other transnational actors. Rosenau argues: 
scientists and social movements have instigated virtually all existing 
international environmental agreements, and in many cases were key 
actors in their negotiation, implementation, and monitoring. 
Moreover, these non state actors are infusing new rules, processes, and 
norms into both new and existing social structures.50 
However, like Keohane, Rosenau does not believe that the existence of non-state 
actors implies the surrender of the state. Rosenau says: "It would be imprudent, 
however, to predict the withering away of the state; nation-states remain key actors, 
even if their interest, identities, and power are rendered problematic by growing 
importance of non-state actors." Like Keohane, Rosenau's position could be 
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criticized as being in contravention of realism, especially when applied to 
environmental issues that present a "structural contradiction between Earth as an 
integrated system and the nation-state system based upon the principles of 
sovereignty and territorial exclusivity. "51 However, Rosenau argues that the 
"multicentric world of non-state actors can coexist with the state-centric world." 
Thus, the sub-paradigm used in this research is one that accepts Rosenau's assertion 
that non-state actors can co-exist with sovereign states, and Keohane's contention 
that institutions facilitate cooperation, without rejecting Waltz's analysis based on 
structural variants. Thus, the theoretical framework employed in this research 
examines structural variants such as perception, knowledge, and affordability while 
accepting that there are institutionalized forms of cooperation based on shared 
interests. Structural realism is therefore supplemented by an analysis that takes 
seriously institutions adhered to, and practiced by, states. 
SECTION III - CONCLUSION 
Currently, there has been a great deal written about the international system, 
suggesting that the sense of stability following World War II is eroding. 
Furthermore, with the end of the Cold-War, foreign policy is not made solely by 
power seeking. Correspondingly, many scholars suggest a larger emphasis should be 
placed on order seeking, concentrating on non-state instruments of the state system 
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such as international organizations and regimes. The argument has two major 
premises. First is the belief that states that seek order are less likely to engage in 
war. As Deutsch explains, " ... the hope that by delegating more and more common 
tasks to such specific functional organizations, the world's nations will gradually 
become integrated into a single community within which war will be impossible."52 
The idea is premised on the belief that the more states need and know each other, 
the less likely they will be to harm one another. 
Seccnd, and more striking, is the premise that interdependent states are more 
likely to achieve their most desired outcome in an orderly states system. Because 
order provides predictability, states are in a better position to devise strategies based 
on the information they know of other states. Thus, states' perceptions are closer 
to reality and misperceptions are minimized in light of predictable information.53 
Many scholars of realism have altered their positions in order to adjust for the 
dichotomy between the manifest interdependence in the state system and the reality 
of national sovereignty. Especially regarding certain issues that are inexorably 
transboundary, such as nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear energy safeguards, ozone 
depletion, international trade, and collective security issues, states have invested their 
energies in the maintenance of order rather than the exercise of power. Thus, the 
world politics traditionally typified by a predilection for conflict over cooperation is 
identifying an increasingly vast arena of issues that call for policy coordination. In 
these situations, power politics, while perpetually necessary, is not sufficient for issues 
that require order. In this research, a neorealist perspective is employed and 
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operates from the assumption that coordinate policies can occur between self-
interested states when it is beneficial for them to engage in such a cooperative 
venture. 
In sum, the preceding discussion on realism is important to this research 
because it establishes a theoretical framework that can be used to test the hypothesis 
that states are more likely to support regulatory policies for the environment when 
the issue is perceived as serious, substantiated by a high degree of knowledge, and 
affordable. Because environmental issues are seldom resolved through non-
cooperative measures and since states remain the central actors in international 
politics, it is significant to reconcile matters of coordinated behavior and issues of 
realism. 
J .L. Pennell - Page 31 
Chapter Three: Cooperation Under Realism 
SECTION I - COOPERATIVE INTERACTION PATTERNS 
Introduction 
Regulatory policies for transboundary environmental issues pose unique 
obstacles to the nation-state. Chapter Two, Section One explicated four reasons why 
this is so. Most evidently, transboundary issues inevitably straddle borders calling for 
international attention rather than unilateral state policy. Second, environmental 
protection requires policymakers to act in foresight because the deleterious effects 
of certain activities cannot always been seen immediately. Third, because 
environmental degradation is ofttimes irreversible, policymakers must adopt an 
intergenerational perspective and act in a precautionary manner, before the 
damaging action reaches a "crisis" level. Fourth, competing economic and political 
issues may hinder cooperative efforts for the environment. For instance, the United 
States and Russia have eased into a period of detente, shifting away from issues of 
security. Still, this shift does not necessarily imply that environmental issues will gain 
policymakers' newly available attention. Russia, for example, is an industrialized 
nation with an inability and unwillingness to bring environmental concerns to the 
fore. The United States, while interested in addressing issues of manifest concern, 
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remains skeptical of many others. Strictly from a classically realist perspective, the 
prospects for effective policy for transboundary environmental problems remain slim. 
There is "realistic" hope, however. Realistic hope can be differentiated from 
"utopian" hope in that the former does not err on the side of naivete as does the 
latter. In this chapter, cooperative strategies for state-centric interaction are 
explored. Cooperation, it is argued, is a strategy sought by self-interested states, for 
the same reasons conflict is pursued. Based on rational decision making, states 
oftentimes find reason to coordinate their policies with those of another, based on 
the perception that joint, rather than independent, decision making will yield a 
preferable outcome. Cooperation does not undermine the primacy of the sovereign 
state in international affairs when it is viewed as a beneficial strategy. 
Cooperation Defined 
Both cooperation and conflict are strategies for interaction that all states 
employ as rational actors. Thus, cooperation, in this research, is defined as a type 
of strategic interaction states choose because it is in their interest to do so. 
Cooperation involves choice and a rational estimate of the payoff involved.54 As 
a strategy for reaching a desired goal, cooperation is also a policy-approach. 
Keohane defines cooperation as active policy coordination on behalf of states to 
"adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preference of others. "55 More 
exactly, Keohane explicates: 
Intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed 
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by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of 
their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination.56 
Similarly, Charles Lindblom contends: "A set of decisions is coordinated if 
adjustments have been made in them, such that the adverse consequences of any one 
decision for other decisions are to a degree and in some frequency avoided, reduced, 
or counterbalanced or overweighed."57 Milner too, explains cooperation as "goal 
directed behavior that entails mutual policy adjustments so that all sides end up 
better off than they would otherwise be."58 Consequently, cooperation presupposes 
that states will act rationally in expectation of eventuating a mutually-beneficial 
exchange and it is " ... the anticipation of bettering one's own situation that leads to 
the adjustment in one's policies."59 For example, many states made mutual 
adjustments in their policies regarding CFC production based on the shared belief 
that cooperative efforts to decelerate ozone depletion leads to a better outcome than 
non-action. 
Strategic Interaction 
Both cooperation and conflict are strategies for interaction that all states 
employ as rational actors. However, according to the doctrine of Realism, 
cooperation, i.e. policy coordination, occurs only rarely in the international system. 
Further, according to Stein, when cooperation does occur, it is spurred from conflict, 
and is done to confront a common threat. Thus, cooperation is ephemeral and 
infrequent. States value sovereignty foremost and, to guard against its encroachment, 
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states secure their borders from external aggression.60 To pursue this security 
agenda, states seek power. To seek power, as a means to protecting security, is a 
state's dominant strategy for maintaining sovereignty. As power seekers, states must 
assume a "state of war," which results in a competition. According to realism, the 
competition which results from the drive for power is the only order that should 
emerge in international anarchy.61 Thus, the competition that results from the state 
of war assumption is perpetual. 
History, however, has proven that the state system is not quite a rigid as this 
Hobbesian state of nature; states are not strictly war-mongers and frequently find 
reason to coordinate their policies for reasons other than to deal with a common 
threat. Consequently, realism has traditionally found hardship in explaining the 
existence of order amid anarchy. Order often requires rules and institutionalized 
arrangements. For the realist, rules and institutions that are coincident with state 
interest are unnecessary, and " ... any that deviate from those concerns would not be 
efficacious, for the states would merely pursue their interests. "62 Thus, for the 
realist (and other self-centric philosophies such as liberalism), the question remains 
the same: given the self-interested nature of sovereign states, and the uncertainty 
prevalent in a state system absent authority, what motivates states to cooperate? 
This research suggests that states may base their decision to cooperate, in a state 
system absent a centralized authority, on two factors. First, states consider their 
perception of future interactions - what Robert Axelrod calls "the shadow of the 
future."63 Section II of this chapter looks at this factor, and examines perception of 
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future interactions in reference to reciprocity, premised on the idea that states that 
regard other states as future partners are more likely to engage in repeated 
exchanges. Thus, the perception of future relations may be why states choose 
cooperation as a strategic interaction, and reciprocity may be how states cooperate. 
Second, upon choosing cooperation over conflict, states estimate the purpose 
for this type of interaction. Purpose for cooperation, is discussed in the third section 
of this chapter in the language of "regime" analysis premised on the idea that states 
may form regimes when they share a common interest and common goal. Thus, 
commonality may be the reason why states cooperate, and regime formation may be 
the method for cooperative interaction. 
Cooperation thus, indicates that states as rational actors are goal-minded and 
partake in cooperation with the expectation of receiving rewards and gains. When 
one state benefits from a certain action and another state does not, the potential for 
conflict arises. However, when both states share the perception that the interaction 
can be mutually beneficial, a common interest is generated, and cooperation becomes 
logical.64 Therefore, in situations where a common interest is engendered and 
mutual gains can be acquired, cooperation is derived from calculated and purposive 
behavior between interdependent states.65 
Interdependence 
Most contemporary international relations scholars claim that states are 
becoming increasingly interdependent. 66 Interdependence refers to the probability 
J .L. Pennell - Page 36 
that the change in one component of a system will produce a predictable change in 
another component. 67 Keohane asserts that in protecting their citizenry's economic 
interests, that have increasingly come to straddle boundaries, states have become 
economically interdependent.68 Gilpen, most notably, has commented on this 
phenomenon and defined the term political economy to describe the "reciprocal and 
dynamic interaction" in international economic relations.69 Interdependence is not 
exclusive to the economic realm, however. From environmental matters to military, 
telecommunications, technology, science, international travel, mail, radio frequencies, 
and atmospheric testing of weaponry, states are becoming more interdependent. 
States, while culturally, linguistically, and geographically diverse, are "... also 
inescapably interdependent; and in some respects this interdependence has increased 
in this day of the shrinking world.'170 In rare situations, states may be indifferent 
to another states. As metaphorically depicted in a single round of Prisoner's 
Dilemma, actors are indifferent to the moves of the other. However, this description 
is not representative of the state system, " ... this is a deficient image of reality. 
Relationships among states are ongoing and persistent."71 
Keonane distinguishes three varieties of interdependence. The first type of 
interdependence is instrumental to describe situations where states (as egoists) do not 
care about the welfare of the other state but fear the adversary may retaliate against 
its own defection.72 Second, states may be situationally interdependent. State A 
may be concerned about the interests of State B because State B could improve the 
situation of State A.73 For example, a decline in economic prosperity in Japan 
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and/or Europe would reduce the demand for U.S. goods. Similarly, a bankrupt third 
world country that borrowed from the U.S. would be unable to repay its debts. 
Lastly, Keohane uses empathetic interdependence to describe a situation in which one 
state is interested in the welfare of another state for its own sake. 
Scholars such as Keohane believe that interdependence is fostered by non-
state actors. 74 Beliefs such as this have their origins in the theory of functionalism 
premised on the hope that " ... by delegating more and more common tasks to such 
specific functional organizations, the world's nations will gradually become integrated 
into a single community within which war will be impossible. "75 Others reject the 
assertion and argue that interdependence is world politics as usual; interdependence 
is the result of rational action based on a cost/benefit analysis of policy coordination. 
Succinctly, states remain sovereign entities and will not surrender any decision-
making power to non-state actors unless it is in their interest to do so. Stein 
addresses this issue well. He argues against the conclusion that interdependence 
restricts a state's decision making capacity. If this were the case, the international 
system could indeed be described in terms similar to domestic society. However, the 
international arena is still one in which everything goes. Moreover, it is a system 
where the use of force remains thinkable.76 Thus, for Stein, interdependence occurs 
as the result of a state's rational choice to eschew its dominant strategy of 
independent decision making, in favor of joint decision making, when better results 
can be gained. In Chapter Five of this paper, the IAEA is discussed as a non-state 
actor used by states because it is useful. 
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Clearly though, Stein does not suggest that interdependence does not exist, 
as he explicitly says how the advancements in technology, communication, and 
science, have worn away isolationist policies of the past. Thus, his argument against 
interdependence is not to deny the myriad interactions states have in today's world, 
but to suggest that even within these interactions states have decisions to make based 
on rational choice. Many states choose to manage their interdependencies by 
selecting policies that contribute to the orderliness of the state system. Based on the 
idea that order lessens uncertainty and enhances predictability which augments the 
decision making process and ultimately leads to better outcomes, states choose 
policies which contribute to orderliness. 
Maintaining Order 
Interdependence implies that the decisions of one state will affect some other 
state(s). Given interdependence, an orderly state system is desirable. Order is 
desirable for many reasons, not all of which will be addressed in this paper. 
However, one reason order is desirable is because it decreases uncertainty by 
increasing predictability. States chart their strategies according to their perception 
of other states which is based on the information available to them. Thus, a 
perception is a guess based on imperfect and/or incomplete information. 
Consequently, states often possess misperceptions. As Stein points out, 
misperceptions only matter in situations of interdependence.77 Misperceptions are 
irrelevant to states independent of one another because a change in one's behavior 
does not affect the other state. Hence, the maintenance of order is significant given 
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the multitude of realms in which states are interdependent. And, given states' 
interest in these realms, the perpetuation of order is a priority in their agenda. As 
such, states find efficacy in investing in a certain level of regulation and rules to 
maintain order. In the environmental realm, regulated production of CFCs and 
safeguards against nuclear accidents are examples of rules and regulations adhered 
to that contribute to the orderliness of the state system. 
Furthermore, some scholars argue that the maintenance of order is more 
effective today than during the Cold War. During the time of the Cold War, 
policymakers viewed the state system in zero-sum terms. 78 It is argued that 
methods for maintaining order were less than effective in a zero-sum foreign policy. 
Correspondingly, in this post Cold-War era, order may be more prevalent as the 
state system may be more amenable to variable-sum, rather than zero-sum outcomes. 
Policymakers believe the maintenance of order will benefit the state by facilitating 
their realization of a desired outcome based on the idea that minimizing uncertainty 
and increasing predictability enables states to act more rationally. 
Ultimately, international relations scholars have the task of explaining why 
states choose the strategies they do: why did State A choose cooperative-strategy X 
which contributed to the order of the system, while State B threatened force with 
strategy Y? Theories about cooperation among nation-states in the post World-War 
II era have emerged as a particularly interesting topic to international relations 
scholars, economists, and diplomats, especially since realism - the dominant 
approach to international relations - finds difficulty explaining the existence of order 
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amid anarchy.79 States continually develop "institutionalized arrangements for 
structuring international relationships in various domains. "80 And, while realism 
contends that such institutional arrangements are not pertinent to world politics, 
states continue to create and maintain them. Ultimately, the realist analysis has only 
the choice to conclude that institutionalized arrangements, which facilitate order in 
the state system, correspond with states' interests and are efficacious to attaining a 
desired goal. 81 
The preponderance of cooperation literature in the last 20+ years aimed to 
explain state behavior has focused on the systemic level of analysis.82 The systemic 
level of analysis focuses "on the sources of and constraints on cooperative behavior 
among states as a function of the international system."83 System level theories 
have manifested themselves in systemic and game theoretic models, used 
metaphorically to discuss the different types of cooperation and the conditions under 
which cooperation is most likely to be successful. Especially the literature on game 
theory has been effective to the extent that it has elucidated certain conditions under 
which cooperative interaction is likely to emerge. It is important for this research 
that the reader understand the fundamental concepts of systemic level theory in 
order to evaluate the effectiveness in using the structural variants, perception, 
knowledge, and affordability, as tools for explaining cooperative interaction patterns. 
Therefore, game theory will be used to this end. While certain scenarios may not 
apply to transboundary environmental issues, such as a single round of Prisoner's 
Dilemma, all the games discussed are illustrative in that they show policy outcomes 
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are limited by the actions of other players. This point is important for all issues 
ranging from Cold-War security issues to environmental policy making. 
Game Theory 
According to game theory, states aim to maximize their wins and to minimize 
their losses.84 Further, states are concerned not only with their wins, but also with 
how their wins fare compared to other states.85 Game theory is useful in explaining 
how states go about achieving these optimal goals by interpreting state behavior.86 
Games metaphorically illustrate the dilemma states face in choosing one move over 
another by showing the extent to which the actions of one state depend on the 
actions of another. As Bram explains, "what distinguishes game-theoretic models 
from other models of rational choice is that the outcome is assumed to be contingent 
on the choices of more than one player."87 Or, in Waltz's words, " ... the freedom 
of choice of any one state is limited by the actions of all others."88 
However, shortcomings abound in game theoretical models because they are 
ill-equipped to adjust to the many structural variants endemic to world politics. 
Perception, rules, norms, traditions, incomplete information, and miscommunication, 
are examples of these variants. Perception, as a structural variant, is exemplary in 
this regard. As rational actors, states devise their strategies based on what they want, 
the information they know, and the information they do not know.89 As world 
politics is characterized by rampant uncertainty, states possess incomplete knowledge 
of other states' capabilities and intentions. As such, states' perceptions are often 
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misperceptions in that they do not always represent the reality of another state's 
capabilities and/or intentions. 
Nonetheless, (mis)perceptions are the foundation upon which decisions are 
based. And, states often will choose one choice over the other based on this 
perception. Furthermore, perceptions are a two-way street. Even if State A 
possesses full information of State B's capabilities and intentions, State B may not 
have full knowledge of State A's goal. Thus, State B may behave in a way that 
obstructs State A's strategy. In short, there are many factors over which states have 
no control that inexorably affect their endeavor to reach a desired outcome. For 
example, State A can only reach desired outcome X if State B does Y. However, 
State A cannot be certain State B will do Y, making State A's reward contingent on 
a factor outside of its control. 
Moreover, game theoretical models are complicated by the number of players 
involved and whether or not the states plan on meeting again. Of course in 
environmental issues, because of the enduring nature of their problems, there is a 
high probability that multiple players and multiple plays (iterated games) will be 
involved. Therefore, game theoretical models cannot describe world politics exactly, 
but they can "profitably" describe state behavior.90 As Waltz explains, "the 
reference to game theory does not imply that there is available a technique by which 
international politics can be approached mathematically."91 However, games are 
useful in that they represent a situation where the moves of one state largely depend 
on the moves of its adversary. As Snidal elucidates: "The ultimate promise of game 
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theory lies in expanding the realm of rational-actor models beyond the restrictive 
confines of the traditional Realist perspective to a more complex world where 
concern is less exclusively with problems of conflict and as much with problems of 
cooperation."92 
Some games are referred to as zero-sum (or fixed sum) games, in which the 
sum of all payoffs to all players equals zero, so that anything one player wins, some 
other player or players must lose.93 Two-player fixed-sum games of this type occur 
when one player wins and one player loses. Cold-War thinking described a two-
player fixed-sum game; what was believed to be good for the United States was bad 
for the Soviet Union, and vice versa. In world politics, more games are variable-sum 
games, "... in which the players not only win something competitively from one 
another, but also collectively stand to gain or lose something from an additional (or 
secondary) player .... "94 Two variable-sum games readily used in world politics are 
"chicken" and the "prisoner's dilemma." 
Some situations in world politics are typified by states that share a common 
threat. The game of "chicken" is used to describe this situation as it metaphorically 
depicts head-on confrontations in situations where the state that yields to pressure 
is deemed the chicken.95 Teen-age gangs used to play the game of chicken, where 
on an open road, one member from each group would drive their respective cars 
toward each other at high speed. The driver to swerve is named the chicken and the 
driver who perseveres praised a hero. Of course, two other options are mutual 
cooperation in which case no one wins, and mutual defection which leads to a crash. 
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Thus, for both players to cooperate (and swerve, so to speak) is a suboptimal move. 
However, the player who cooperates (and swerves), as its adversary defects (and 
perseveres), is disgraced. Similarly, to defect (and not swerve) is only optimal if the 
adversary swerves. If the adversary also defects, the demise of both players is the 
result. An environmental example may be a situation where two neighboring states 
both participate in an environmentally degrading activity such as the polluting of a 
river which contaminates the fish. State A may decide to cease this activity (and 
"swerve"). However, State B may continue to pollute the river and fish, thus 
attaining "hero status" for persevering by achieving the economic advantage derived 
from the activity. State A and State B also derive the benefit of a partially effective 
environmental control, the metaphorical equivalent to neither being involved in a 
head-on collision. 
Prisoner's Dilemma is another game used metaphorically to depict 
international conflict and analyze state behavior. Prisoner's Dilemma differs from 
chicken in that the element of "promises" is introduced. As the story goes, two 
suspects are apprehended. The governor of the prison needs a confession from at 
least one of the prisoners. The governor offers one prisoner his freedom and a sum 
of money to confess before the other prisoner does; if he confesses his counterpart 
will be hanged. The other prisoner is given the exact option as the first. Both are 
told absent a confession from either, i.e. if they both keep quiet, they will be set free 
but without the reward. And, if both of them confess on the same day, they will 
receive a ten-year sentence but not be hanged. Thus, each player achieves the best 
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outcome by defecting, i.e. confessing and receiving the reward and no prison time, 
if the other player cooperates. Consequently, each player takes the risk and cheats 
trying for the optimal outcome, and ultimately, achieves the least optimal outcome 
for both (assuming both take the risk). Therefore, to cheat and get ahead is the 
most compelling choice, cooperation is not, even though players are better-off to 
cooperate than to defect.96 In the environmental realm, an LDC for example, may 
promise to adhere to certain regulations in exchange for financial and technical 
assistance. Once the assistance is received however, the LDC may defect, gaining 
not only the benefit derived from the promise but also profiting from the economic 
advantage associated with the defection. 
Applied to world politics, the highest benefits are gained when State A 
unilaterally defects and State B cooperates (DC), mutual cooperation (CC) is the 
second best outcome, mutual defection (DD) is the third most optimal outcome, and 
lastly, unrequited cooperation (CD) is least favored (i.e. State A cooperates, State 
B defects, and therefore State A receives the least favored outcome ).97 In Stein's 
words, "states are thus coercive institutions that... eschew their dominant strategies, 
as a matter of self-interest in order to ensure an optimal rather than a pareto-
deficient equilibrium outcome."98 The payoff for the prisoner's dilemma therefore 
is different than the game of chicken. In the prisoner's dilemma mutual defection 
is the third most favored outcome whereas in chicken it is the least desired. 
Ultimately, cooperation is a strategy based on the situation the state finds itself in 
and the choices available to it. As this is true, cooperation is not necessarily good 
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from a moral point of view. Cooperation is ridden neither with normative value nor 
with a positive connotation in the international state system, and this is as it should 
be. Cooperation refers to policy coordination, a strategy for reaching a certain goal. 
As a strategy, i.e. a sequence of moves, cooperation serves a purpose: to achieve the 
most desired outcome. Thus, cooperation does not deny the existence of conflict; 
to the contrary, without conflict or the threat of conflict, there is no need to 
coordinate policy.99 Accordingly, policy coordination (or cooperation) is 
distinguishable from harmony which is an automatic absence of discord. 100 
Cooperation does not inherently imply that states (or people) like each other. 
The liberal makes this mistake. The liberal tends to believe that peace is fostered 
when leaders come together to communicate their interests. Cooperation, the liberal 
contends, comes from the communication and realization of shared interests of 
leaders around the world. The liberal's belief that bringing leaders together to 
communicate their interests will facilitate peace is prevalent. One reason the United 
Nations was created is to encourage communication among leaders. However, there 
is no reason to believe "knowledge and familiarity either generate common interests 
or reduce conflict of interest."101 As Stein keenly observes: 
If familiarity and knowledge were at the heart of cooperation, families would 
not feud, couples would not divorce, and war would not be most common 
among states that share borders. Just as actors who do not interact cannot 
cooperate, so they cannot fight. Knowledge of others' needs is the basis both 
for empathy and for extortion and exploitation.102 
Moreover, familiarity can also breed contempt, e.g. for one leader to come to know 
another neither implies that the former will like the latter nor will the former 
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necessarily understand and empathize with the latter. 103 For State A to understand 
State B's interest does not mean that State A will empathize with State B. In fact, 
State A may become acutely aware (more so than if the states' leaders never met) 
of how diametrically opposite the two states' positions are. 
An acute example of cooperation as a strategy is the forming of pacts. A pact 
is a negotiated compromise, based on interdependence, in which competing actors 
can "neither do without each other nor unilaterally impose their preferred solution 
on each other if they are to satisfy their respective divergent interests. "104 
Oftentimes states form pacts to achieve their most desired outcome. Thus, the 
negotiated compromise is a mutually-beneficial" ... agreement among a select set of 
actors which seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of 
power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the 'vital interests' of those entering into 
it.105 A pact, as a form of policy coordination, quintessentially illustrates its 
strategic character. Moreover, pacts demonstrate that cooperation is a form of policy 
coordination that neither implies the absence of conflict or the eradication of state 
sovereignty. Ultimately, the wealth of literature on "cooperation under anarchy" 
reflects the fact that states, while perpetually sovereign, have an interest in 
cooperation. 
Section Conclusion 
To briefly reiterate, the intent of this Section in Chapter II - Cooperative 
Interaction Patterns, was to introduce the complexity involved in addressing 
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environmental issues in a state system of self-interested sovereign states. The 
transboundary and often global nature of environmental problems pose obstacles for 
the heretofore dominant theory of realism based on power politics. Power politics 
fails to explain cooperative efforts states have demonstrated in addressing 
environmental issues. However, this Section has discussed the notion that 
cooperation does not imply the withering away of the sovereign state. Cooperation, 
as a strategic interaction, can often yield the best outcome for egoists, particularly 
in environmental issues which do not readily lend themselves to power politics. 
Moreover, because of the interdependent nature of states, cooperation occurs when 
a state chooses to eschew its dominant strategy of independent decision making, to 
join a collective effort, based on the belief that preferred gains can be reached. 
Further, order was discussed as a desirable quality of the international system for 
states that desire to manage their many interdependencies. Order enhances 
predictability and therefore facilitates coordinated behavior. Discussing these various 
terms is important to developing this research's analytic framework. This chapter has 
the purpose of examining why cooperation occurs, and what methods are used. This 
is of fundamental significance to this research project precisely because 
environmental issues cannot be analyzed simply in terms of unilateral state action. 
Environmental issues require the concerted effort of many states. Because 
transboundary environmental problems cannot be addressed unilaterally, and seldom 
are ameliorated through the use of force, a clear understanding of cooperation is of 
seminal importance to this research. This next section discusses the perception of 
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future relations as a reason why states choose to cooperate and reciprocity as the 
method for how states cooperate. 
SECTION II - PERCEPTION OF FUTURE RELATIONS AND RECIPROCITY 
According to the logic of games, such as Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken, 
states are better off to cooperate than to defect. But, in a single play they usually do 
not because of the distrust and uncertainty each state perceives of the other. 
Defection is encouraged because, absent a common authority, it cannot be punished 
and compliance cannot be enforced. As Jervis puts it: 
Because there are no institutions or authorities that can make and 
enforce international laws, the policies of co-operation that will bring 
mutual rewards if others co-operate may bring disaster if they do not. 
Because states are aware of this, anarchy encourages behavior that 
leaves all concerned worse off than they could be.106 
However, if states have the expectation of future relations, "cooperation becomes 
more rational and desirable.107 Axelrod asserts that iterated relations improve the 
likelihood of cooperation.108 The perception that the game will be iterated lends 
viability to tacit cooperative agreements. That is, present cooperation is increased 
based on the likelihood of future situations. An iterated situation presupposes that 
states expect to deal with each other in the future, which is a sound assumption. In 
Oye's words, "international politics is characterized by the expectation of future 
interaction.'1109 Therefore, states may be rational to employ strategies which 
encourage cooperation based on the belief that they will experience continued 
interaction. Reciprocity is one strategy for fostering cooperation in iterated 
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situations. 
Reciprocity is described in a variety of ways and therefore does not off er a 
singular definition.11° Keohane defines reciprocity as "exchanges of roughly 
equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior 
actions of the others in such a way that good is returned for good, and bad for 
bad. "111 Reciprocity therefore involves action coordination. Axelrod explains 
"strategies of reciprocity have the effect of promoting cooperation by establishing a 
direct connection between an actor's present behavior and anticipated future 
benefits." However, reciprocity involves more than just matching behavior; two 
applications for reciprocity can be identified as a norm, and as a strategy. The 
usages are not mutually-exclusive, however, the division is effective for the sake of 
analysis. 112 
Reciprocity as a Strategy. Keohane's identification of specific reciprocity 
refers to a strategy in which" ... specific partners exchange items of equivalent value 
in a strictly delimited sequence. "113 Therefore, specific reciprocity refers most 
commonly to a method of contingent exchange. Readily employed in game theory, 
Axelrod's notion of Tit-for-Tat is illustrative of specific reciprocity. States that use 
the strategy Tit-for-Tat cooperate on the first move and thereafter mirror the move 
of the other. It is the idea that "reciprocity refers to a balanced exchange premised 
on threats and promises .... A promise to respond to present cooperation with future 
cooperation and a threat to respond to present defection with future defection .... "114 
Specific reciprocity does not invoke obligations and occurs as a simultaneous 
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exchange, operating on a quid pro quo basis, one project at a time. States may 
usefully employ specific reciprocity when they do not trust, or fear being exploited, 
because "everything is on the table" - the terms, actors, rewards, and thus 
vulnerability is decreased and the chance for exploitation is reduced. The parties of 
this relationship need not be obligated to one another - only to trust enough in the 
situation to believe that the cooperative effort will be seen to fruition. The 
relationship is based on proximate goals rather than a long term commitment to 
stable and cooperative relations. States that Specific reciprocity is a good way to 
cooperate in anarchy but does not promote cooperation. 
Reciprocity as a Norm. Reciprocity as a norm, on the other hand, refers to 
policy coordination that does not follow the stringent patterning of Tit-for-Tat. As 
a norm, reciprocity pursues a path based on established relations and traditional 
norms. This is not necessarily to say that behavior will not be matched, rather, it is 
to suggest that sometimes it will not. Some states' relationships may be so strong 
and established as to forego the exacting contingencies of Tit-for-Tat. States may 
engage in reciprocal exchange simply because it is customary, routine, or habitual for 
them to do so. 
Reciprocity as a norm subscribes to certain standards for behavior, 
emphasizing a state's relationships and commitments. States that engage in 
reciprocity as a norm cultivate a spirit of legitimate behavior and reinforce the 
prospect for cooperation into the future. This position suggests that some states 
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constitutive of the international environment engender a sense of sociality. 
However, sociality does not co-opt self-interest. Rather, states' voluntary behavior 
is attributed to more than just self-interest. The sociality that accompanies voluntary 
action lends more to a standard of behavior, norms, or general practice based on 
shared interests. This description implies that states that employ reciprocity as a 
norm may do so because it is routine, traditional, and because it is beneficial. 
Sharing similar characteristics, but not synonymous to reciprocity as a norm, 
is Keohane's classification of "diffuse reciprocity."115 Diffuse reciprocity refers to 
the tacit cooperation between states that can "occur without communication or 
explicit agreement. "116 Tacit cooperation does not require an explicit agreement, 
instead, cooperation is based on the perception of future action and reaction.117 
States' perceptions greatly influence the strategy choices they make. Perception thus, 
is a "forecast. "118 based on a probabilistic assessment of an uncertain and unknown 
future." 119 Stein elucidates: 
If actors behave purposely given the information available to them, perception 
- the information that actors possess about others - can be a critical 
determinant of behavior. At times, therefore, perception, and hence 
misperception, can provide the foundation for the particular choice between 
cooperation and conflict.120 
As such, a state's strategies are largely crafted around its opponents intentions. In 
foreign policy, for example, actual military resources are less an issue than that 
state's intention to either use or supplement its current buildup. State A's ability to 
predict the intentions of its opponent B, based on A's perception of B's capabilities 
leads to one strategic choice over another. Hence, the choice to cooperate is largely 
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dependent upon whether a state views itself as interacting with another state long 
into the future. Axelrod's theory of cooperation, which is highly attuned to 
reciprocity, finds that "the shadow of the future" significantly influences the agent's 
decision to cooperate.121 Therefore, future expectations weigh heavily on the 
success of cooperation. 
Diffuse reciprocity is typified by debt-owing which "imposes obligations."122 
The obligations occur in a sequential nature of contingent action and reaction, unlike 
specific reciprocity where the balanced exchange is simultaneous. Therefore, the 
relationship between states continues on-going, sometimes indefinitely. The debt-
credit relationship is important to diffuse reciprocity because it involves "mutual 
concessions within the context of shared commitments and value. "123 Diffuse 
reciprocity is based on standards of behavior and established patterns. For example, 
for a state to repay a loan over a period of time is more significant than a 
simultaneous exchange. The former illustrates commitment and obligation to the 
relationship, establishing patterns of compliance and cooperation. 
By definition, reciprocity implies a relationship of mutual exchange. This 
merely means that a party gives one thing to receive something else. Applied to the 
international state system, typified by negotiations, bargaining, strategies, and norms, 
it seems evident that states engage in all types of exchanges. A few examples may 
be situations where tangible items are exchanged (such as resources in trade), 
promissory notes appropriated (as in financial loans), or advantages and privileges 
granted (as in diplomatic relations). Reciprocity also may involve action on one side, 
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and inaction on the other. An example of this type of exchange may be a negotiated 
settlement, such as the abandoning of a nuclear program in exchange for financial 
assistance. Moreover, reciprocity may also embody agreement by all parties not to 
do something. For example, an agreement to stop producing clorofluorocarbons 
because they deplete the ozone. In other words, reciprocity involves many different 
variations of exchange, from resources to promises. 
All types of reciprocity are defined in terms of contingency and equivalence. 
Contingency in that reciprocity "implies actions that are contingent on rewarding 
reactions from others that cease when those expected reactions are not 
forthcoming. "124 Reciprocity is equivalent in the sense that it is never an exact 
exchange but is usually mutually-beneficial. The exchange is "mutually valued but 
non-comparable [in terms of the] goods and services."125 Relationships in the state 
system will always be asymmetric. However, asymmetry is tangential so long as the 
exchange is mutually beneficial. Therefore, "rough" equivalence in value is a better 
characterization than "exact." In Keohane's words, "reciprocity refers to exchanges 
of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the 
prior actions of the others in such a way that good is returned for good, and bad for 
bad. "126 Each state's action is contingent on the preceding actions of the other 
participating state's action. Self-interest can lead to abuse of reciprocity because 
measuring equivalence is arbitrary and the potential for exploitation is real. Thus, 
reciprocity involves the perception of equitable exchange. The lack of trust inherent 
in the state system often times exploits the notion of equitable exchange. 
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For example, reciprocity during detente was tenuous because the competitive 
nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship led to disagreement regarding what was 
equivalent. Neither state "was willing to make substantial unrequited concessions in 
the hope of eventually achieving reciprocity. "127 Both sides were suspicious of the 
other; both feared being the "sucker" in the Prisoners' Dilemma (i.e. being recipient 
to unrequited cooperation). The distrustful relationship allows neither side to 
envision a future of Detente. As a consequence long-term visions of cooperation 
were overshadowed by the proximate concerns of being cheated. 
Played serially, reciprocity in the Prisoners' Dilemma is an effective strategy 
for cooperation.128 Reciprocity as a strategy that promotes iterated relations can 
lengthen the shadow of the future and improve the prospects for cooperation. This 
position, however, is diminished as the numbers of players increase. The increase 
in players affects the probability of defection, the unlikelihood of sanctioning, and 
the ability to coordinate policy. The chance for cooperation decreases as the number 
of participants increase because defection escalates and is usually unsanctioned.129 
Furthermore, Oye says that as the number of players increases, "the recognition of 
opportunities for the advancement of mutual interests, as well as policy coordination 
once these opportunities have been identified, decreases. "130 The most pervasive 
problem states face in multi-lateral relationships is the free-rider problem. The free-
rider state reaps the benefit of the public (i.e. collective) good through the provision 
of others without having to contribute. As Keohane explains "public goods are 
indivisible and cannot be denied to any member of a group, regardless of whether 
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that member contributed to their provision."131 In certain circumstances states as 
rational actors deduce that free-riding is the best option. Some states view the free-
rider option as desirable because defection usually does not lead to punishment. 
That is, the powerful and more dominant states do not benefit significantly from 
enforcing non-compliance. Therefore, the defecting state seldom fears retaliation, 
or is not concerned by the severity of it (which is usually not severe). Indeed, in 
certain circumstances free-riding is the most rational option. 
There are ways to mitigate the problems associated with free-riding. Keohane 
recommends specific reciprocity as a method for avoiding free-riding. 
Decomposition may also mitigate the complexity of multi-lateral circumstances. 
When multi-lateral relationships are partitioned into smaller groups there is a greater 
ability for the group's participants to ensure compliant behavior. Oye reinforces this 
view by saying that "strategies to reduce the number of players in a game generally 
diminish the gains from cooperation while they increase the likelihood and 
robustness of cooperation."132 Keohane asserts that the participants can more 
effectively monitor behavior and maintain control in small arrangements. The small 
groupings avoid the free-rider (public goods) problem by making the goods 
somewhat privatized.133 Furthermore, regimes may be useful for improving the 
prospects for cooperation in multi-lateral situations because the institutional 
arrangements established by the regime structures state behavior. The next section 
discusses regime formation. Regime formation is an effective state cooperative 
interaction for confronting transboundary environmental issues. 
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SECTION III - COMMONALITY AND REGIME FORMATION 
Relationships which require interaction beyond specific reciprocity are risky 
because states fear being cheated (as they too, are compelled to cheat). Thus, 
specific reciprocity presents itself as a safe and effective method of exchange because 
vulnerability is lessened in this type of quid pro quo transaction. However, to say 
that the predominant method of interaction among states in world politics is typified 
by specific reciprocal relationships would be false. Many scholars have been quick 
to point out that a single round of prisoner's dilemma does not accurately depict the 
state system. In reality, the international system is riddled with structural variants 
such as norms, tradition, history, rules, regulations, and the perception of meeting 
again, which inhibit a state's capacity to conduct their relationships on a quid pro quo 
basis. Seldom, can a transnational issue be effectively addressed by a simultaneous 
one-time exchange. Certainly, issues such as arms control, environmental protection, 
international trade, etc., involve continued relations between participating states. 
Moreover, these types of matters cannot always be dealt with bi-laterally. In order 
to be effectively confronted, these issues require the participation of many states. 
Ultimately, specific reciprocity is an effective and necessary strategy for some 
situations, but not sufficient to deal with all international issues. Situations which 
require the participation of many states, and which require continued attention, call 
for a different type of strategic interaction. Regime formation is one strategy which 
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is effective for confronting a common interest, and reaching a common goal, in 
multi-lateral and long-term problems. 
Although defined in various ways, the term "regime," in this research, refers 
to the development of an institutionalized arrangement used to structure state 
interaction. 134 This arrangement is generated when states share a common goal, 
based on a common interest, which can only be effectively achieved through a joint, 
rather than independent, effort.135 This definition accords with the realist 
assumption of interest-based international politics as "relations between sovereign 
entities dedicated to their own self-preservation, ultimately able to depend only on 
themselves, and prepared to resort to force. "136 In other words, self-sufficient and 
sovereign states, "develop their own strategies, chart their own courses, make their 
own decisions. "137 
The term regime has been overused, misused, ill-defined, and interpreted in 
a myriad ways, to the extent that it has lost explanatory value. For example, John 
Ruggie first introduced the concept in international politics literature in 1975, 
alluding to "a set of mutual expectations, rules an regulations, plans, organizational 
energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of 
states."138 At the most general level, a regime is merely patterned behavior which 
exists in all areas of international relations. Regularity in behavior, thus, must be 
accompanied by principles, norms or rules to account for it. Krasner, more 
specifically, offers a normative account of a regimes as: 
sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
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procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area 
of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and 
rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights 
and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for 
action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making 
and implementing collective choice."139 
Krasner's definition of regimes, while most widely used, is problematic because it 
lacks precision and as Young points out, "does not allow us to separate regimes 
easily from the rest of international relations."140 Young assets that regimes come 
into existence as a response to collective-action problems, in situations where 
individual self-interest leads to undesirable outcomes.141 Moreover, Oye, Keohane 
and Axelrod, believe regimes are mechanisms for institutionalizing behavior, which 
have the effect of reducing uncertainty.142 Milner too, points out that the 
information provision function of regimes is significant in that it promotes 
cooperation by lessening uncertainty in negotiation situations. 
To say the least, the literature on regimes is voluminous and often 
imprecise.143 With the countless definitions of the term "regime," it is no wonder 
scholars disagree about the concept's effectiveness for analyzing state interactions in 
world politics. Consequently, some find regime analysis illuminating for 
understanding international politics, while other scholars find the concept of 
international regimes as "yet one more woolly concept that is a fertile source of 
discussion simply because people mean different things when they use it."144 
Concurring, Stein says, " ... many scholars define 'international regimes' so broadly as 
to constitute either all international interactions within a given issue area. "145 To 
J .L. Pennell - Page 60 
define a regime too broadly, is to make "no conceptual advance" in using the 
term.146 
Nonetheless, regime analysis is useful if done with specificity. For the 
purpose of this research, a regime is an institutionalized arrangement generated to 
structure state interaction in situations where states share a common goal, based on 
a common interest, which can only be effectively achieved through a joint, rather 
than independent, effort.147 These types of situations inspire states to eschew their 
dominant strategy of independent decision making based on rational choice which 
"leads them to prefer joint decision making because independent self-interested 
behavior can result in undesirable or suboptimal outcomes."148 If these conditions 
are not demonstrated, states will not form regimes. States base their strategies and 
decisions on interests and preferences, which can be conflict, cooperation, or some 
variant thereof (which is world politics as usual, not regime formation); "as long as 
international state behavior results from unconstrained and independent decision 
making, there is no international regime."149 A regime differs because it involves 
"interaction between parties [that] is not unconstrained or is not based on 
independent decision making. "150 In this view, regimes will only be formed as a 
consequence of states' preferences and interests. A regime will not develop if states 
are able to obtain their most preferred outcome independently. 
Some situations preclude a state from obtaining its most favored outcome 
unilaterally. Stein has identified these situations as "dilemmas of common interests" 
and "dilemmas of common aversions." Dilemmas of common interests refer to 
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situations where "all actors prefer another given outcome to the equilibrium 
outcome."151 The Prisoner's Dilemma where the dominant strategy equals the 
equilibrium outcome that is sub-optimal is illuminating in this sense. Situations 
representative of dilemmas of common interests are collective goods problems, such 
as collective security and international trade. Regimes may be formed to deal with 
collective goods issues in situations where the good's "optimal provision can only be 
assured if states eschew their independent decision making that would ... ultimately 
result in either the suboptimal provision or the nonprovision of the collective 
good."152 For example, states are faced with a security dilemma as they most prefer 
disarmament to mutual armament. Nonetheless, states which sign onto arms control 
agreements maintain their dominant strategy which is to cheat. Thus, arms control 
agreements, such as the SALT agreements, are replete with provisions for 
compliance and policing.153 
Dilemmas of common aversion avoid a particular outcome. States may have 
different primary interests, but do agree that "there is at least one outcome they all 
want to avoid. "154 Thus, a regime formed to combat a dilemma of common 
aversion is significant in promoting order in the international system because 
participation may occur at the expense of other interests. Thus, situations 
characterized in this manner provide incentive for states to eschew their independent 
decision making and form a regime.155 For example, all states have an interest in 
avoiding air disasters. As a safeguard, states adhere to rules under the International 
Civil Aviation Organization. Included in these rules is the guarantee that the pilots 
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and control center operators are able to communicate. English, has been recognized 
as the international language of air control to avert the chance that communication 
cannot occur. "Tragedy of the commons," refers to the unrestricted individual use 
of the environmental commons and is another example of regime participation. It 
may seem evident that environmental problems acutely illustrate a dilemma of 
common aversion. However, this may not always be the case. Predominantly, states' 
least preferred outcome is not the exhausting of a resource, Stein elucidates: 
... each actor most prefers to be the only user of a common resource, 
next prefers joint restraint in the mutual use of the good, then prefers 
joint unrestrained use even if it leads to depletion, and least prefers a 
situation in which its own restraint is met by the others lack of 
restraint. 156 
In other words, the highest benefits are gained when State A uses the resource and 
State B does not (DC, i.e. Defect/Cooperate), mutual restraint (CC) is the second 
best outcome, unrestricted use (DD) is the third most optimal outcome, and lastly, 
unrequited restraint (CD) is least favored (i.e. State A restrains its use and State B 
does not, and therefore State A receives the least favored outcome ).157 Therefore, 
to be the only user of the resource is the optimal outcome, joint restraint is not. 
But, if both parties use the resource unrestrained, they both receive unfavorable 
outcomes. The goal for environmental regime formation is usually the suboptimal 
outcome of mutual restraint (CC). 
Most likely, environmental issues are both dilemmas of common interests, and 
dilemmas of common aversion. Admittedly, states usually will not agree to restrain 
their use of a resource unless a substitute method is available. However, 
J.L. Pennell - Page 63 
environmental problems are not always a Prisoners' Dilemma. The realization that 
some states are taking unilateral action, or receiving less than sub-optimal outcomes 
from their environmental protection policies, demonstrates a commitment to averting 
a problem even if an optimal or sub-optimal gain is not received. 
Dilemmas of common interests and common aversions demonstrate situations 
where states may forego their dominant strategy of independent decision making, 
while still operating within a self-interest based realist paradigm. The idea is 
premised on the belief that a preferable outcome can be gained collectively, rather 
(or more easily) than independently. State's interests and preferences, and the 
subsequent interactions taken on their behalf, determine whether or not that state 
will find it advantageous to join a regime. In certain situations, interests and 
preferences can only be satisfied if the state enters into a collaborative arrangement. 
In Stein's language, autonomous and self-interested states may create regimes "when 
confronting common dilemmas."158 Therefore, dilemmas of common interests and 
dilemmas of common aversions prompt states to join regimes and forego their 
independent decision making. 
SECTION IV - CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the strategic interactions between and among 
states. States, as self-seeking maximizers, seek power as their primary strategy for 
protecting security and ensuring sovereignty. For these egoists, the use of force 
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remains a viable method for gaining power. However, states also find it a beneficial 
strategy to coordinate their policies. However, to be effective, the transboundary 
nature of environmental issues require states to coordinate their policies. Thus, 
some states believe preferred gains can be achieved when they choose to manage 
their environmental interdependencies by eschewing their independent strategies and 
coordinating their policies. 
Upon choosing a cooperative strategy, states consider long and short term 
goals. Depending upon whether the state considers itself dealing with its partner in 
the future will affect whether or not the former state will adjust its policies around 
the latter's. Contingent on this perception, the state may choose specific reciprocity 
or diffuse reciprocity as methods for strategic interaction. In situations where 
reciprocity is ineffectual, states may choose to form a regime. Regime formation is 
useful in situations where many states' participation is required in order for a goal 
to be reached. Further, regime formatioH is useful for confronting long-term, 
evolutionary problems, as opposed to short-term, delimited issues. Environmental 
problems require a concerted, long-term effort, and therefore are responsive to the 
cooperative strategy of regime formation. In summary, states may choose to 
participate in a regime to confront an environmental problem when they perceive the 
seriousness of the issue, possess a high degree of knowledge, and can afford to eschew 
their primary strategy of independent decision making. 
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Chapter Four: Stratospheric Ozone Depletion 
Introduction 
Faced with a common interest and a common goal states may choose to 
forego their dominant strategy of independent decision making, based on the belief 
that a collective venture will more effectively facilitate the realization of their end 
than a unilateral effort. 159 Often joint efforts are required for effective 
management of long-term, continuous issues - situations which cannot be addressed 
by a one-time negotiation. Arms control, international trade, and environmental 
protection, are issues which demand an on-going strategy. Transboundary 
environmental protection is especially distinctive because policies must not only be 
on-going, they must also be adhered to by many states in order to be effective. 
Efforts taken to slow the depletion of the stratosphere ozone layer are exemplary of 
this type of situation. Ozone depletion is transboundary and therefore requires the 
attention of many states. Further, policies for the protection of the ozone require 
policymakers to act in foresight because the damage from ozone depletion is not 
seen immediately. Moreover, policymakers must act in a precautionary manner 
because ozone depletion is irreversible; waiting for a crisis to develop will be too 
late. Consequently, states chose to join together their decision making capacities to 
reach their common goal of protecting the ozone layer from further depletion. 
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Beginning with the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 
("Vienna Convention") with the objective "to protect human health and the 
environment against adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human activities 
which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer" and leading to the 1987 
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer ("Montreal 
Protocol") with the purpose "to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary 
measures to control equitably total global emissions of substances that deplete it, 
with the ultimate objective of their elimination on the basis of developments in 
scientific knowledge, taking into account technical and economic considerations and 
bearing in mind the developmental needs of developing countries, "160 the use of 
ozone-depleting substances is successfully being regulated. The Protocol includes 
regulation of five CFCs and two halons leading to a 50 percent total reduction in 
production from 1986 levels.161 The 1990 London Amendments tightened 
regulations, and states agreed to a total phase-out of fifteen CFCs, three halons, 
carbon tetrachloride, and methyl chloroform during the next ten to fifteen years. As 
of January 1992, 81 states (49 developing) were Parties to the Vienna Convention 
and 75 states ( 43 developing) were Parties to the Montreal Protocol. In March of 
1993, over 100 nations participated in the Fourth Meeting of the Montreal Protocol 
in Copenhagen, Denmark, and decided to reset the year 2000 deadline to January 
1996. 
Consequently, the Montreal Protocol has gained considerable attention in the 
environmental literature - frequently touted as a success and, furthermore, as a 
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model for future environmental agreements.162 However, the success of the 
Montreal Protocol may be an inimitable situation. Simply, the effectiveness of the 
Protocol's regulatory policy may be attributed to a variety of unique factors which are 
not evident in all environmental problems. 
First, the effort was spearheaded by a super-power (U.S.) which was 
instrumental to its success in terms of funding and publicity.163 Chief U.S. 
negotiator of the Montreal Protocol believes that U.S. leadership was instrumental 
in gaining the support of reluctant and skeptical states to regulate CFC 
emissions.164 Second, the fact that a substitute for the regulated chemicals was 
readily available was a fortunate factor. One author comments," ... an agreement to 
phase out a single family of chemicals, for which substitutes are increasingly 
available, is a weak test at best."165 Third, the fact that DuPont, the leading 
producer of CFCs, made the decision to switch to non-depleting ozone substitutes, 
was essential to the process. Fourth, a depleted ozone implied a "human linkage" 
associated with an increase in cancer, cataracts, and immune-response deficiencies. 
Conceivably, if a depleted ozone did not presume an increase of potentially terminal 
risks, it would not have generated the level of concern that it did. Finally, 
accommodations were granted to less-developed countries based on principles of 
economic and political equity. 
The Montreal Protocol is owing to all of these unique factors for its 
achievement. Thus, it may be inappropriate to look to the Montreal Protocol as a 
model to be replicated for all future environmental issues. Identifying the degree of 
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cognition, knowledge, and affordability, as structural variants that contributed to its 
success is a more fruitful endeavor. In the language of this research, states 
supported the environmental regulatory policies to protect the ozone, by signing the 
Montreal Protocol, because the policymaker's cognition of the problem was keen, i.e. 
there was a perception of threat, the policymakers possessed a wealth of information 
on the problem which convincingly persuaded them of its seriousness, and the 
policymakers estimated that their states could afford the enactment of the policies 
to the extent that other economic and political issues did not override the cause. 
The ozone regime is discussed below in terms of perception, knowledge, and 
affordability. 
The "Ozone Regime" 
The term "regime" has been defined in this research as the development of 
an institutionalized arrangement used to structure state interaction.166 This 
arrangement is generated when states share a common goal, based on a common 
interest, which can only be effectively achieved through a joint, rather than 
independent, effort. 167 The "ozone regime," then, consists of participating states 
that interact with each other based on the shared goal of protecting the ozone from 
further depletion and which share the perception that this goal cannot be reached 
unilaterally and can only be reached collectively. This conception of the term 
"regime" has explanatory value because it enables the analyst to interpret state 
behavior. However, the term "regime" also has practical utility in that physical 
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entities are needed to fulfil the mission of the regime. First, the ozone regime 
consists of individuals within their respective states who support the cause of ozone 
depletion deceleration. These individuals include policymakers, scientists, advocates, 
environmentalists, advisors, translators, interest groups, financial donors, etc. 
Second, the ozone regime is replete with resources which are necessary to bring 
about the desired regulatory policy. Resources include individuals, organizations, 
money, bui1dings, grants for research, telecommunications, etc. For example, the 
U.S. spearheaded the effort, contributing $100 million to NASA's budget and 
employing the preponderance of researchers and scientists. Individuals from the 
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Oceans, and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES), and atmospheric scientists in the 
international community all participated in the process.168 Third, the ozone regime 
possesses guidelines governing its "prescription." That is, the regime is charged with 
a certain task, to regulate CFC emissions to decelerate the depletion of the ozone. 
Ultimately, these practical aspects of a regime remind us: "Only the state has the 
human and financial resources to mount the large-scale scientific and technical 
projects for detecting, monitoring, and preserving the global environment. "169 
The practical (or, perhaps, "physical") aspects of a regime only materialize 
subsequent to the development of the theoretical conception. States, via its 
policymakers, cannot do in practice what they do not first perceive of in theory. 
Thus, first comes the cognition that there is a problem - perception of threat. 
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Knowledge supplements this perception by either encouraging or discouraging state 
action. If states decide that the problem is in need of attention, the state then judges 
whether it can afford such a policy. Subsequently, an agreement (in the case of the 
ozone, a treaty) is signed and the ozone regime is charged with a task. The steps of 
the creation of the ozone regime are traced in the following discussion. 
History of the Problem 
In 1974 atmospheric researchers at the University of California at Irvine 
called attention to the possible damage to the ozone layer from chlorine and 
bromine bearing chemical compounds - chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and halons in 
particular.17° Called by the name the Rowland-Molina hypothesis, the 1974 study 
showed that the chlorine in CFC emissions deplete the natural stratospheric ozone 
by disintegrating ozone molecules, and, that a depleted ozone layer does not 
effectively shield harmful ultraviolet rays from reaching the earth.171 The 
stratospheric ozone layer shields ultraviolet rays from penetrating too deeply into the 
atmosphere. CFCs and halons have been identified as the leading culprits to 
depleting the ozone layer. CFCs are the key element in aerosol propellants, 
refrigerants, cleaning agents, and sterilants. Halons are used primarily as fire 
extinguishing agents in the aviation and marine industry owing to their fire 
suppressing ability.172 It is believed that when CFCs and halons are released into 
the atmosphere they float to high altitudes and react with the ozone. The reaction 
causes a depletion and allows more ultraviolet-B radiation to reach the earth. In 
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short, "man-made chlorine chemicals deplete the stratospheric ozone layer."173 The 
deleterious effects to humans are an increased risk of skin cancer, cataracts, and 
adverse impacts on the immune response system. Agricultural productivity is 
reduced as well and animal life (marine food chain) is vulnerable to the ultra-violet 
rays.174 Additionally, CFCs, as a greenhouse gas, accounts for 1/4 of the 
"greenhouse effect" from global warming.175 The "greenhouse effect" occurs as a 
result of infrared-absorbing gases in the lower atmosphere that create a warm 
insulating blanket by allowing the shortwave portion of the radiation spectrum from 
the sun to penetrate to the earth but not to radiate back as they normally would if 
unobstructed. Trapped in the lower atmosphere a warming effect occurs, analogous 
to the way glass traps heat in a greenhouse allowing temperatures to build, the 
chemicals trap radiation enabling warming.176 
Perception 
After twelve years of active debate, the Montreal Protocol was signed by 
thirty-one countries based on the shared perception that the ozone was being 
depleted and that it was harmful. The policymakers and atmospheric scientists who 
supported the regulatory policy of the Montreal Protocol all embraced the Rowland-
Molina hypothesis that the chlorine in CFC emissions deplete the natural 
stratospheric atmosphere. Moreover, they subscribed to the scientific method that 
employed a "common set of values, which stressed preserving the quality of the 
environment, and accepted causal analysis. "177 Some groups were concerned 
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primarily with pollution and/or health risks, while others worried about global 
warming, while still, other focused strictly on the depletion of the ozone as an 
environmental tragedy itself. Thus, while advocates of the regulatory policy had 
different motivations for their support, they all agreed that the depletion of the 
ozone was harmful.178 Similarly, all members showed a common interest in 
protecting the environment. 
The perception that the problem is grave, even in the absence of a crisis and 
in light of uncertainty, is tantamount to the enactment of effective regulatory policy. 
Policymakers faced a dilemma as they needed to decide if the available data and 
research on ozone depletion merited sufficient consideration to take regulative 
measures. While a perception of threat was shared, uncertainty remained. 
Consequently, policymakers contemplated applying the precautionary principle to the 
ozone treaty. The principle had been employed formerly in declarations on sea 
pollution and hazardous wastes.179 It states " ... [that] action must be taken to 
ensure that the loading capacity of the environment is not exhausted, and it also 
requires action if risks are not yet certain but only probable, or, even less, not 
excluded."180 The Montreal Protocol, building on the pledge of the Vienna 
Convention, decided to embrace the precautionary principle. In doing so, it affirmed 
the position that environmental law may act in foresight when there is a shared 
perception of a problem in need of attention and when the information amongst 
states is shared and corroborated based on "relevant scientific knowledge, taking into 
account technical and economic considerations. "181 The difference between the 
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Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol illustrates this point well. The 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, signed by twenty 
countries on March 22, 1985, did not accomplish much more than signatory states 
agreeing to continue collaborating on research: 
"[to] protect human health and environment from adverse effects 
resulting or likely to result from human activities which modify or are 
likely to modify the ozone layer .... [agree to] co-operate by means of 
systematic observations, research and information exchange in order 
to better understand and assess the effects of human activities on the 
ozone layer and the effects on human health .... 182 
The vague language of the Vienna Convention lacked specific regulations. The 
European Community and Japan were not convinced that restrictions were merited 
unless definitive data regarding the depletion of ozone could unequivocally be 
attributed to anthropogenic chemicals.183 In contrast, the U.S. and the Toronto 
Group184 advocated precautionary action, arguing that "the margin of error between 
complacency and catastrophe is too small for comfort. "185 
However, scientific evidence on ozone depletion "matured," as did the 
perception of threat. Information on the depletion of the ozone grew in terms of 
volume, accuracy, and believability. More states became convinced of the gravity of 
the issue when the scientists substantiated the existing data by proving that the ozone 
was being depleted even more than the models predicted.186 Support grew, and 
only then did the framework of the Vienna Convention develop into the first step for 
regulatory measures.187 Believability of the depletion increased exponentially in 
1985 when a hole in the ozone was discovered over the antarctic. Estimated to be 
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the size of the continent, the "anomaly" was never predicted and could not be 
explained. Thus, "the discovery of the ozone hole, combined with the unexpected 
increases in CFC use, alarmed the public and added a sense of urgency to the 
international discussions. "188 At this point, states possessed more information than 
ever about the problem. Their perceptions grew immensely regarding the grave 
nature of the problem. 
The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer was 
signed in September of 1987. The preamble states: "Determined to protect the 
ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to control equitably global emissions 
of the substances that deplete it. "189 The signing of the Protocol was a unique 
occurrence of international cooperation because at the time, definitive data was not 
available to validate the hypothesis that CFCs deplete the stratospheric ozone.190 
Scientists and industry representatives agreed in 1987 that "there was not enough 
data to provide definitive answers about the cause of the decreases."191 Moreover, 
the Montreal Protocol was signed during the years of the Reagan administration. 
The administration's environmental policies opposed the Protocol because regulation 
hindered U.S. economic interests. President Reagan's environmental policies abroad 
were largely focused around U.S. competitive advantage, which meant focusing on 
market mechanisms perhaps at the expense of the environment. The Protocol was 
signed and stringent regulatory measures were imposed on the global use of CFCs 
nonetheless, based on the ozone regime's belief "[that] even in the face of the 
scientific uncertainties ... we nevertheless believe that the nature and extent of the 
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long-term risks require a prudent insurance policy in the form on international 
controls. "192 
The Montreal Protocol is frequently cited for the "cohesive" effort responsible 
for its success. Haas has labeled the "community of shared knowledge" an epistemic 
community to reflect this unity. However, to date, many critics of the Rowland-
Molina hypothesis assert that ozone depletion is wrongly attributed to anthropogenic 
causes. These critics argue that CFCs are not the blame, nature is to blame. The 
"blaming nature" argument asserts that natural sources of chlorine in the 
stratosphere, such as seawater, volcanos, and biomass account for more ozone 
depletion than man made chemicals and therefore discount the theory that CFCs 
break down the ozone. However, the critics who use this argument use non-scientific 
data and employ propaganda more than substantiated research. Linwood Callis, of 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Langley Research Center, points 
out that this argument is false because chlorine from natural sources is soluble and 
so it is rained out of the lower atmosphere. CFCs are insoluble and inert and rise 
to the stratosphere to release their chlorine. Thus, while the critics' argument is 
prima facie false, it is also widely believed. The thousands who listen to Rush 
Limbaugh, for example, hear him say "Mount Pinatubo spewed forth more than a 
thousand times the amount of ozone-depleting chemicals ... than all the fluorocarbons 
manufactured by wicked, diabolical, and insensitive corporations in history."193 
Amid competing perceptions such as this one based on blaming nature, knowledge 
is increasingly valuable. While Limbaugh, for example, may be able to convince his 
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listeners based on propaganda, fortunately, policymakers look to the scientific 
community. 
Knowledge 
Acti: .. 1g as surrogates for the state, policymakers are required to negotiate 
policy in many different realms. Concerns regarding the degradation and 
conservation of the environment pose new challenges to them because in effect they 
are being asked to make decisions in areas of inexpertise. In Keohane words, "the 
complexities of security in a nuclear age, and of economic viability in an era of 
interdependence and rapid technological change, have created demands by 
policymakers for expertise on a myriad of international political issues. 11 
Environmental problems implicate an entire spectrum of disciplines, ranging from 
physics to biology, meteorology, and atmospheric chemistry. Rosenau comments" ... 
environmental issues are perhaps more fully pervaded by technical and complicated 
dimensions than any other type of issues on the global agenda. 11 Moreover, many 
environmental problems are transnational. Issues ranging from acid rain, global 
warming, and ozone depletion must be addressed internationally.194 Thus, 
information discovered in one state is not enough; in order for many governments 
to perceive the threat of environmental degradation, knowledge must be shared by 
many states. Accordingly, policymakers from governments around the world look not 
only to their own, but to an international scientific community of knowledgeable 
specialists which can effectively explain, translate, and interpret the overwhelmingly 
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technical and scientific information. 
Information technology has changed the world as we know it. Industrialized 
states have access to unlimited information and the capacity to communicate it 
globally. Some scholars believe when information is readily available, states are 
more inclined to participate in regimes.195 Stein explains, "new knowledge thus 
changes state preferences and provides the basis for international cooperation."196 
Similarly, Haas says the proliferation of knowledge derived from a community of 
shared knowledge may motivate states to form a regime of joint decision making, if 
the information derived from the community is perceived by policymakers to be 
believable, reliable, and accurate. Haas employs the term "epistemic community" to 
describe these specialists. Haas defines: 
[an epistemic community as]... a network of professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or 
issue-area." [The network shares]: (1) normative and principled beliefs, 
which provide a value-based rationale for the socialization of 
community members; (2) causal beliefs, which are derived from their 
analysis of practice leading or contributing to central set of problems 
in their domain and which then serve as a basis for elucidating the 
multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcome; 
(3) notions of validity; (4) common policy enterprise.197 
Haas believes that the Montreal Protocol was signed largely because the 
"epistemic community" influenced the state to forego its primary economic interests 
and join the regulatory regime.198 He assumes that governments (via the scientific 
community) perceived the danger identified with a depleted ozone as severe and 
therefore forfeited the economic gains associated with exploiting the resource. 199 
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Haas claims that government looked to the epistemic community to explain the 
ecological dangers associated with the depletion and contends the shared effort of 
the epistemic community successfully fulfilled this task by proving to be accurate, 
reliable, and competent, so much that their findings "alerted governments to the 
urgent need for collective action.1120° Furthermore, Haas claims that the Montreal 
Protocol's success (mainly with regard to terms and stringency) is largely attributable 
to the ecological epistemic community. He explains: 
In the absence of a group of professionals with the ability to interpret 
the technical and scientific evidence, there would have been little 
incentive for the U.S. or other countries to try to move beyond the 
weak 1985 Vienna Convention. Without U.S. leadership, traditional 
interest based negotiations among equals would have yielded at most 
an international protocol reflecting the lowest common 
denominator. 201 
This position holds that the information produced by the epistemic community was 
a powerful force in directing attention to the protection of the ozone. The increase 
in knowledge attracted policymaking attention, and eventually led to the formation 
of the ozone regime. 
However, Haas' use of the epistemic community to explain the success of the 
Montreal Protocol is a narrow one because it fails to take into consideration other 
structural variants such as perception and affordability. Perception was influenced by 
the human link and scare of cancer. The affordability factor was largely swayed by 
U.S. and DuPont involvement, and the availability of substitutes. If other factors 
were irrelevant, environmental policy decisions would be based solely on the findings 
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of the epistemic community. If this were the case, the epistemic community would 
divide and compete for policymakers' attention. Consequently, the epistemic 
community with the most power, i.e. money, prestige, ability to persuade, exposure, 
would dictate policy. In short, the process for making policy would be analogous to 
a political campaign. 
Though Haas' monistic explanation is narrow, it is nonetheless important 
because it focuses attention on the significance that knowledge, as a structural variant, 
has on the policymaking process. It is meaningful that scientists who composed the 
transnational regime communicated around the globe regularly, sharing and 
dispersing information. UNEP's coordinating committee on the Ozone Layer 
provided a vehicle for frequent correspondence between U.S. scientists and their 
counterparts around the world.202 Ultimately, knowledge is directly pertinent to 
the policymaking process, but, other factors are equally significant. 
Affordability - Industrialized Developed States and LDCs 
In this research's introduction, wealth was distinguished from affordability. 
Wealth refers to a state's resources, possessions, and capabilities; any capital that can 
be turned into money contributes to a state's wealth. States' wealth, therefore, are 
vastly different. However, all states are similar in that they all are faced with making 
decisions regarding affordability. To afford something is to bear the cost without a 
serious detriment. Thus, to afford something is to make a choice between competing 
interests in a justifiable manner. Environmental issues are predominantly linked to 
other economic and political interests and therefore to afford environmental policy 
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often means to subordinate competing economic and political issues. CFCs may be 
replaceable and therefore the burden of using substitutes is small. Issues of a more 
complex nature, such as the reduction of fossil fuels, is more problematic. Fossil 
fuels are regarded as a major economic commodity because they are the most 
common source of energy, which obviously, most states expend. Most states have 
developed their economy, infrastructure, and lifestyle around the belief that 
convenient energy sources will continue to be abundant and exploitable. In this case, 
policymakers are faced with having to answer "whether [society] is willing to risk the 
added carbon dioxide in the atmosphere for the present benefits of burning fossil 
fuels" 203 Fortunately unburdened by a complex issue such as fossil fuel reduction, 
many states (developing and industrial) decided that they could afford to enact 
regulatory policy to ameliorate the ozone depletion problem. Even so, many 
complex issues remained and " ... there were still issues of North/South equity that 
needed to be reconciled politically. 11204 
LDCs goals begin with economic growth and political stability; efforts aimed 
at protecting the environment offer very little to the realization of these goals. First, 
LDCs argued that they should not be required to be party to an agreement that 
regulates CFC use considering the industrial states are mainly responsible for the 
mass production and consumption that depletes the ozone. Industrialized states 
consume 84% of all compounds of CFCs whereas LDCs consume 16%. Second, 
LDCs claimed that regulation would threaten their economic development in the 
areas of refrigeration, electronics, and automobile manufacturing. Development in 
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these industries require the use and expansion of CFC production. Lastly, LDCs 
asserted that technology to find replacements for CFCs is not readily available to 
them as it is to the industrial states. Industrialized countries do not struggle with 
the same issues as developing states, however, they must contend with the many 
competing political and economic interests prevalent in a democratic, market 
economy. Historically, environmental protection policy has not been a high priority 
for industrial states. Thus, while industrial states may have the wealth to enact 
regulatory policy, they may not be able or willing to bear the cost. Hence, the 
affordability factor affects industrial and developing states differently. Ultimately, 
any policy action to combat environmentally degrading acts will dislocate present 
economic standards because competitiveness will be affected for industrial states and 
development impaired for developing states.205 
Because of these factors, many accommodations were made. Industrial states 
realized if accommodations were not made, non-participating LDCs would increase 
domestic production. This would have two negative effects. Most obviously, non-
participating LDCs could capture the CFC production market and gain a competitive 
advantage ~conomically. Second, their increased domestic production would negate 
the effort of the industrial states' compliance. The framers of the Protocol believed 
that fairness through accommodation was the most effective method for inducing 
LDC's submission. UNEP's executive director Mostafa Tolba, as an Egyptian, 
represented "the interest of the less developed countries as well as those of UNEP." 
Under Tolba's leadership, UNEP provided funds for about ten LDCs to send 
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delegates to the ozone negotiations in February 1987.206 Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, 
Kenya, Mexico, and Venezuela articulated LDC's position to not " ... retard their 
economic growth or face impeded access to air conditioning and refrigeration as they 
industrialized and their populations' demands grew."207 Thus, "the treaty had to be 
designed in a manner that would satisfy LDC demands for exemptions yet prevent 
the LDCs from undermining the treaty's effects by attracting CFC producers to their 
countries."208 
The Protocol aimed to persuade LDCs to join the ozone regime and refrain 
from ozone-depleting practices, while addressing concerns of equity, in two ways. 
First, the industrial states made ample accommodations for the LDCs. Second, the 
industrial states attached economic incentives and contingencies to compliance and 
defection respectively. These accommodations were mutually-beneficial for LDCs 
and industrialized states; " ... for a number of developing countries, this meant that 
cooperating and bargaining for special consideration carried more benefit than 
staying outside the agreement. For the coalition of states committed to the 
Protocol's objectives, it was worth giving developing countries 
[accommodations]. "209 
Equitable Accommodation. One of the goals of the Montreal Protocol was 
to be fair to the LDCs and to respect their different needs and timelines for acceding 
to the regulations. The Vienna Convention, on discussing cooperation in research 
and development, takes " ... into account in particular the needs of the developing 
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countries."210 Moreover, Article Five of the Montreal Protocol allows for a 10 year 
grace period for the implementation of control measures, for special financing to 
assist the developing countries in Article 10, and for the transfer of technology to 
developing countries "under fair and most favourable conditions."211 LDCs in 
Article V of the Protocol are legally distinguished from industrial states as "any Party 
that is a developing country and whose annual calculated level of consumption of the 
controlled substances is less that .3 kilograms per capita on the date of the entry into 
force of the Protocol. ... " Given this accommodationist provision, Mexico, Egypt, and 
Ghana, signed on.212 Article V states were granted exemptions so that their 
economies could continue developing. They were also offered incentives to 
discourage the building of their own CFC production plants. The accommodationist 
content of the Protocol included an extra ten years to meet production and 
consumption limits, and access to information and advice on the technologies 
developing states were using for recycling and conserving CFCs. Further, LDCs were 
granted technical assistance on developing substitutes for CFCs. Moreover, in 1990 
at the second Meeting of Parties, a balanced voting procedure amendment was 
adopted which requires a two-thirds majority of parties among industrial and less-
developed states. Furthermore, accommodations were not only made to LDCs. The 
Protocol aimed to accommodate all signatory states, for example, instead of 
specifically regulating each CFC element, it regulated the total percentage of cuts. 
Consequently, Japan was able to concentrate its production on CFC-133 which is 
used for computer manufacturing. 
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Economic Incentives. Economic incentives provide a veritable consequence 
for LDCs if they do not comply. Trade bans are one way of circumventing the 
possibility of an environmental policy being undermined by non-participating LDCs. 
The Montreal Protocol needed to avoid the increased domestic production of CFCs 
in developing states as industrial states as net exports began regulating their own 
production. Therefore, the Montreal Protocol attached contingencies to non-
compliance, stringent enough that non-participating states would decide cooperating 
is a better choice than defecting (and the short term incentive associated with that). 
In the language of game theory, LDCs needed to view the sub-optimal outcome of 
cooperation as a better outcome than defection (CC > DC). One author believes 
that trade bans were critical in the engineering of the Montreal Protocol to limit 
defection and exploitation of a regulating policy; "Production restriction on 
participating states without a corollary trade ban could simply displace production 
to the part of the world not participating in the regulation, rendering the policy 
completely ineffective in terms of the objective to reduce commodity production."213 
A consumption tax is another method for inducing compliance. If the 
participating states as net exporters, attach a consumption tax on the non-
participating state's production, demand in both participating and non-participating 
states will decrease. Therefore, price drops. As price continues to decline, the non-
participating states can no longer afford to produce because they are net importers. 
In this way, the participating states have induced compliance with the policy. 
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Conclusion 
Collectively, states have confronted the environmentally degrading activity of 
producing chemicals which deplete the stratospheric ozone layer. Characteristically 
unique, ozone depletion has generated a perception of threat in policymakers. These 
officials~ cognition of the problem was keen, as their perception was substantiated by 
a wealth of scientific knowledge, corroborated by many scientific communities around 
the world. Based on their shared perception, states judged whether they could afford 
to address this environmental issue even though other economic interests and 
political concerns may be effected. The affordability factor for some states was easier 
to estimate than others. These states found it rational to bear the cost of addressing 
an the environmental issue because they believe their interests will be risked if they 
do not. Discussed in the language of "victim states"214 or "ecological 
vulnerability"215 it is obvious that " ... countries are most likely to speak out when 
they believe that their vital interests are at risk. ... "216 Sweden and Canada, for 
example, are aware that they will be effected by the acid rain.217 For the ozone, 
Australia's representative commented on the high incidence of skin cancer in 
Australia as the reason his state is supporting regulatory policy.218 Other states 
signed on because in doing so they were put in a better position economically than 
if they were not to. LDCs which received financial and technical assistance, and that 
would have faced sanctions associated with non-compliance, were rational to join the 
collective effort. The remainder of the states evaluated the reward of participation 
in terms of the threat to human health and to the environment that would occur 
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should they not participate. 
Ultimately, the environment won in the case of ozone depletion policy. Many 
environmental issues are not as fortunate as ozone depletion. Global warming, for 
example, will have an extremely difficult time passing policymaking scrutiny because 
of the uncertainty associated with the problems. Committing time and resources to 
confront global warming, a problem that cannot be verified unequivocally provides 
a number of obstacles. Moreover, the active debate among scientists who believe in 
the gravity of the issue, and those who do not, discounts any sort of united front 
needed to convince policymakers to act. If the greenhouse effect is proportionately 
linked to anthropogenic sources (e.g. consumption of fossil fuels; production of 
CFCs), it seems rational (and evident) to implement regulatory restrictions in the 
form of production and consumption limits. For now, faced with uncertainty and 
conflicting data, states will err on the side of caution. The issue of ozone depletion 
has been successful and the "ozone regime" has gained policymaking attention 
because of a level of perception, knowledge, and affordability to its support. Chapter 
Five introduces this research's second case study: Nuclear Energy Accidents, and 
intimates that the structural variants manifest themselves differently in this issue than 
they did with regard to the ozone depletion case study. As will be made clear below, 
regulatory policies for nuclear accidents are enacted largely due to the perception of 
threat derived from their devastating nature. Knowledge as a contributing factor is 
minimized in light of the exaggerated perception. And finally, the affordability factor 
is largely owing to the fact that nuclear accidents can occur in any state; "victim 
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states" simply do not exist as no state is immune to the possibility of a nuclear 
disaster. 
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Chapter V: Nuclear Energy Accidents 
Introduction 
In Chapter Four the transboundary environmental issue of ozone depletion 
was examined in reference to the contributing factors perception, knowledge, and 
affordability. Faced with a common interest and a common goal, states chose to 
forego their dominant strategy of independent decision making to join a collective 
effort based on the belief that a preferred outcome could only be reached jointly. 
Ozone depletion, a long-term, continuous issue, required states to act in foresight 
and in a precautionary manner and therefore was the type of issue prime for a 
collective effort. This collective effort, or "regime," was efficacious in the 
development of an institutionalized arrangement used to structure state interaction. 
Ultimately, the analysis in Chapter Four showed that states chose to participate in 
the ozone regime because their cognition of the problem was acute and consequently 
policymakers perceived the threat involved with a depleted ozone. Policymakers' 
perception of the problem was largely influenced by the scientific community which 
generated a wealth of information on the environmental problem. The believability 
of the information was owing to the international scientific community which 
corroborated, substantiated, and presented the data to, policymakers. Moreover, the 
analysis on ozone depletion examined the affordability factor. It was said that both 
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industrial and developing states found that they could afford to enact regulatory 
policies to protect the ozone. For industrial states the decision was largely 
influenced by the fact that the U.S. spearheaded the effort and there were readily 
available substitutes. For developing states, many agreed to regulations because they 
were offered incentives which made submission a more rational choice than non-
compliance. Further, developing states were aware that informal sanctions would 
follow their defiance. Lastly, developing states were offered accommodations such 
as a ten-year grace period and financial and technological assistance which greatly 
contributed to their decisions to join the structural arrangement of the regime. 
Efforts taken to guard against, and prepare for, nuclear accidents are also of 
the variety which call for joint, rather than independent, decision making. Nuclear 
spills have the capacity to severely affect neighboring states and are therefore 
transboundary in nature. Collective efforts will invariably be more effective than 
unilateral ones. Further, policies that guard against, and prepare for, nuclear 
accidents require policymakers to act in foresight because once the damage occurs 
it will inexorably be wide-spread and long-lasting. Policymakers must also act in a 
precautionary manner because once a "crisis" develops, after-the-fact policies will be 
of little value to the dead, destroyed, and injured. Consequently, states find efficacy 
in joining together their decision making capacities to reach their common goal of 
guarding against, and preparing for, nuclear energy accidents. Beginning with the 
1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty219 there have been several other agreements 
associated with the safe use of nuclear energy. There are regional agreements such 
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as The Application of Safeguards Pursuant to the Tlatelolco Treaty, the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and the US-IAEA Safeguards Agreement of November 18, 1977 
signed September 27, 1983 between the United States and Venezuela220 and The 
Arrangement Between the United States and Switzerland on the Technical Information 
Exchange and Cooperation in Nuclear Safety Matters signed July 20 and August 10, 
1982. Most recently, The International Convention on Nuclear Safety was opened for 
signature on September 20, 1994 and already has 38 State Party signatures based on 
their collective goal to maintain a high level of nuclear safety around the world. 
In 1986, the Chernobyl nuclear energy plant experienced an unprecedented 
disaster, to date, leading to over 125,000 fatalities. Clearly, the disaster at Chernobyl 
unearthed fear in the hearts of millions of individuals around the world; damage 
resulting from this ordeal will undoubtedly be felt for centuries as 1995 
commemorates the ninth anniversary of the horrendous disastrous. As a response 
to the fear evoked by Chernobyl, two Conventions were signed. First, the Convention 
on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident ("Notification Convention"), and second, 
the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident ("Assistance 
Convention"). The Conventions, designed under the auspices of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA"), are to ensure that nuclear facilities and materials 
are used only for peaceful purposes and not for military service. All five nuclear 
weapon states (China, France, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States) have signed the Conventions and combined, 82 states are parties 
to these two conventions. 
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A "nuclear accident" is defined as involving facilities or activities of a State, 
persons, or legal entities under its jurisdiction, "from which a release of radioactive 
material occurs or is likely to occur and which has resulted or may result in an 
international transboundary release that could be of radiological safety significance 
for another State."221 In the event of an accident, the Notification Convention 
provides the State Party to directly notify the IAEA of those states which may be 
physically affected as to the accident's nature, time, and exact location. The 
Convention further provides that State Parties are required to provide the IAEA 
"with such available information relevant to minimizing the radiological consequences 
in those States .... " The Convention's purpose is therefore to provide information 
about a nuclear accident with the intent of minimizing the transboundary radiological 
consequences to the environment, health and economy. Closely related to the 
Notification Convention, the Assistance Convention provides for "prompt assistant 
in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency to minimize it 
consequences and to protect life, property and the environment from the effects of 
radioactive releases. "222 
The IAEA was recognized in Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty as the authority over safeguards for the peaceful use of nuclear activities by 
State Parties. Almost a decade later, the IAEA was the guiding force for the 
Notification and Assistance Conventions. Created in 1957 as an independent IGO 
within the United Nations system and located in Vienna, Austria, over 100 sovereign 
states participate in its program. Stated in its Statute, the IAEA's main purpose is: 
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"To accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and 
prosperity throughout the world and to ensure so far as it is able that assistance 
provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control, is not used in such 
a way as to further any military purpose.223 With the objective of promoting 
peaceful use of nuclear energy, the IAEA works to establish on-site inspections and 
verification system, monitoring and control measures, and scientific operation 
programs. The Statute states the IAEA to: 
encourage and assist research on, and development and practical 
application of atomic energy; make provisions ... for materials, services, 
equipment and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and 
development and practical application of atomic energy; foster and 
exchange of scientific and technical information; encourage and 
administer safeguards; and establish and adopt standards of safety for 
protection of health and minimization of danger to life and 
property. 224 
The Agency has many functions with regard to the Notification and Assistance 
Conventions. The Agency collects and disseminates information to State Parties. 
The Agency also assists State Parties with the preparing of emergency plans in the 
case of a nuclear accident, in the development of training programs, developing 
monitoring programs, and conducting investigations into the feasibility of establishing 
appropriate radiation monitoring systems. Moreover, the Agency makes available 
resources for the purpose of conducting an initial assessment of the accident or 
emergency. 
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Perception 
Nuclear energy technology offers both the perception of "promise" and "peril." 
Two sides of the same coin, the dual nature of atomic energy yields a contradictory 
attitude in the public and policymakers alike. On the one hand, nuclear energy 
offers a viable source of energy used for peaceful purposes. As early as 1945, the 
majority of Americans (57 percent) agreed that "the splitting of the atom will prove 
the greatest invention in over a thousand years and will change many ways of 
living. "225 In December of 194 9 a Gallup poll found only 20% of Americans were 
skeptical that in "fifty years from now trains and airplanes will be run by atomic 
power."226 High hopes for nuclear energy persist. In a 1991 poll, nuclear energy 
was the overwhelming response to the question "what is our primary source of 
electricity 10 years from now?"227 On the other hand, nuclear energy is associated 
with the mass destruction of the bomb and with plant accidents. The escalation of 
nuclear arms in the early 1980's and the Chernobyl disaster where a population of 
17 million were exposed to radioactive fallout and 8 million acres of agricultural land 
were contaminated, elicited an inimitable public fear in societies as a whole around 
the world. The frightening memory of Chernobyl remains close to all individuals; 
April, 1995 commemorates the ninth anniversary of the horrendous disaster, tallying 
the death toll to 125,000. Clearly, the disaster at Chernobyl unearthed fear in the 
hearts of millions of individuals around the world. Thus, although clearly a sufficient 
and economic use of energy, there remains a "public anxiety."228 
Ultimately, in terms of "perception of peril" no issue compares to nuclear 
J .L. Pennell - Page 94 
accidents. Environmental problems such as ozone depletion and acid rain may cause 
effects equally damaging to that of a severe nuclear accident, however, the 
perception of danger associated with a nuclear accident far exceeds these other 
issues. Not even the discovery of a hole in the ozone the size of the entire continent 
over the antarctic compares to a nuclear accident in terms of perceived danger. In 
Young's words, " ... it is much harder to project an air of certifiable crisis surrounding 
the ozone depletion or the carbon dioxide problem than it is with regard to the 
nuclear-accident problem. These problems simply do not have the prominence or 
salience in the public imagination that problems associated with nuclear energy 
have. "229 Further, "[the] nuclear accident problem involves a clear and present 
danger that can be grasped without specialized training."230 Especially, as 
Americans inculcated to the scare of nuclear weapons during the rise and zenith of 
the Cold War, nuclear energy remains a fearful subject. 
On the whole, analysis of public opinion on nuclear energy leads to 
contradictory conclusions. Some polls conclude that society is disenchanted with 
nuclear energy,231 based on their knowledge of incidents such as Three Mile Island 
and Chernobyl. Consequently, perception of peril has the capacity to paralyze policy 
which otherwise would have gained success had its "bad reputation" not imbued its 
meritorious qualities. Nuclear scientist Rothstein argues that the "blanket 
condemnation"232 of nuclear energy has deleterious effects. He explains: 
We cannot afford to be blinded by ideologies, no matter how 
seductive, if we are unable thereby to benefit from actions not harmful 
when done properly. We must base our decisions on good science, do 
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more research if current knowledge is insufficient, and reverse course 
if new dependable knowledge discloses bad effects of an accepted 
modus operandi. When we press the limits of what the planet can 
provide we cannot afford the luxuries of stupidity of self-inflicted 
blindness.233 
Proponents of nuclear energy, as well as advocates for its disuse, carry the burden 
of convincing policymakers of their respective views. Nuclear technology, as both 
promising and perilous, has the capacity to proliferate or diminish based on 
policymakers' perceptions. 
Knowledge 
Perceptions are formed based on the information one has about a certain 
issue. The perception of nuclear energy as promising is based on data available and 
believed by certain individuals; the perception of nuclear energy as perilous, in 
contrast, is derived from different sources of knowledge. As perceptions are based 
on incomplete information, they are often misperceptions. For the proponents of 
nuclear energy, knowledge, as a structural variant, can be significant to alleviate the 
public fear of nuclear energy. If knowledge is substantial, believable, and convincing 
enough, to form the perception of promise, rather than peril, it becomes a very 
valuable factor. 
Three reasons why nuclear energy is feared are because it is believed to be 
environmentally incompatible, costly, and unsafe.234 Thus, the task for supporters 
of nuclear energy is to address the issues of environmental incompatibility, costliness, 
and safety, in such a way that yields conclusions which bode well for the future of 
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nuclear energy. Proponents argue, nuclear energy can be a viable, effective, and 
environmentally safe source of energy. Nuclear energy generates no greenhouse 
gases, emits no harmful substances which cause cancer, or attack eyes, lungs or other 
organs. Further, atomic energy harms neither flora nor fauna, nor does it produce 
acid rain. Except for the possibility of a spill, nuclear energy is safe. Thus, while it 
is impossible to deliver a certifiable guarantee of safety, nuclear energy is a 
comparatively safe choice. The nuclear energy industry argues that "[ n ]uclear power 
can... make better arguments about environmental compatibility and a true 
containment of direct costs compared with alternatives - than it appears to have been 
made in the eyes of public opinion."235 The comparable safety of nuclear energy 
"needs to be made believable to the public in a transparent form - whether causal or 
detailed - and openly embedded in both the philosophy and implementation of future 
nuclear plant construction and operation. "236 
Knowledge, as a structural variant, is also significant in identifying the degree 
of salience an environmental issue has to each state. For example, the acid rain 
problem is very different than the issue of a nuclear disaster. Scandinavian states are 
quite aware that they are victims of sulphur dioxide coming from the British Isles 
and East Canada, and New England knows that the midwestern rain will effect them. 
States that know they are victims will negotiate policy very differently than states that 
are unable to estimate the effects of the environmental problem. As Litfin explains: 
Environmental destruction is particularly apt to galvanize national 
concern when the resources at stake have important cultural or 
symbolic value, like the Muskoka Lakes-Haliburton Highlands Region 
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of Ontario, Canada and the Black Forest of Germany, both of which 
were casualties of acid rain. Obviously, countries are most likely to 
speak out when they believe that their vital interests are at risk, 
lending support to interest-based explanations of regime 
formation. 237 
The regime created under the auspices of the IAEA, which provides for early 
warning signals, emergency processes for accidents, and voluntary checks of safety 
standards, resembles an "insurance policy"238 because participants do not possess 
a priori knowledge of how they will be damaged by a nuclear spill. Behind the veil 
of ignorance in the original position, 239 regime members only know a severe 
disaster would be widespread, long-lasting, and possibly transboundary. As such, 
states cannot always negotiate policy for accidents based on self-interest. Chernobyl 
type accidents are not exclusive to Post-Soviet or less-developed states; accidents can 
happen anywhere. Three Mile Island reminds us that horrendous accidents resulting 
from mismanagement can occur in even the most industrialized states. 
The knowledge policymakers' possess, influences their perception of nuclear 
energy as either promising or perilous, and identifies the salience of the issue, a state 
estimates. The current analysis renders the conclusion that the perceived seriousness 
of nuclear accidents has not been enough to stop states from using nuclear energy. 
The perception of "promise" has led to the proliferation of a number of states 
working to produce nuclear programs. For example, currently Japan, China, South 
Korea and Taiwan are developing nuclear energy plants to boost their economic and 
political status. Japan is looking to become an exporter of nuclear technology while 
J .L. Pennell - Page 98 
South Korea is adding seven more plants to its program. With ambitions such as 
these, how do states afford regulatory policy? 
Affordability 
Perceived for its promise, many states of the world have now harnessed 
nuclear energy and believe it to be a viable energy source. Currently, many Asian, 
East-European, and Post-Soviet states are looking to develop nuclear energy 
programs to enhance their economic position. 240 Japan is currently building six 
nuclear facilities and has aspirations of exporting nuclear technology. Thus, despite 
its history of "atomic victimization, "241 Japan is expanding its military and 
developing plutonium-breeder power generation. In China, the government is 
appealing to foreign companies for money to develop a nuclear energy plant. 
Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng has aspirations of developing this plant in Daya Bay. 
However, residents around this area are weary of the plant as small accidents have 
already occurred during its construction. 242 Sou th Korea already has seven nuclear 
plants and is constructing seven more. Indonesia and Pakistan have plans to develop 
facilities as well. In Mochove, the French are building a nuclear energy plant 100 
kilometers northwest of Bratislave despite claims from environmentalists who claim 
the plant is unsafe. 
Iran too, wants to develop nuclear energy plants. With a worried Israel, the 
United States and Russia have negotiated a deal whereby Russia has agreed not to 
give Iran a gas centrifuge. Even so, Russia is building two nuclear reactors in Iran. 
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Israel claims that Iran does not need this source of energy since it has abundant oil 
resources and oil fired power stations which produce cheap energy. Moreover, China 
and the United States are embroiled in controversy over China's plan to sell two 
nuclear reactors to Iran. However, China traditionally has looked to the West to 
provide components and services it could not supply. The U.S., obviously, will have 
nothing to do with Iran's nuclear plans. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said: 
"Our position is one that Iran ... is simply too dangerous with its intentions and its 
motives and its designs to justify nuclear cooperation of any allegedly peaceful 
character." 
Most notably, on the nuclear energy front, is the situation in North Korea.243 
Party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, North Korea is obliged to submit to the 
standards set by the IAEA. However, North Korea has withdrawn its membership 
from the IAEA as of June 13, 1994. In October of 1994, the U.S. and North Korea 
made a landmark deal to keep Pyongyang from making nuclear weapons. In this 
landmark accord, the U.S. agreed to finance 4.5 billion to North Korea for the 
development of nuclear technology and interim energy supplies if North Korea 
agreed to cease operations at Pyongyang, a nuclear plant that produces plutonium. 
As part of the agreement, U.S. has already sent to North Korea 50,000 tons of oil. 
However, some of the oil was diverted and not used as an energy source. As 
diverting the oil violates the agreement, the U.S. has insisted that monitoring be put 
in place before any further shipments are made. 
Obviously, many states aspire to generate nuclear energy to boost their 
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economic position. The perception of peril, however, compels most of them to 
submit to standards of regulation (North Korea being the major exception). The 
affordability factor is very interesting applied to the issue of nuclear energy. It 
evidences, more than anything, the realist nature of the state system. On the one 
hand, many states are willing to conform to standards set by the IAEA. In doing so, 
states submit to inspections and information provisions of the Notification and 
Assistance Conventions. On the other hand, however, the IAEA is powerless in 
situations of non-compliance. North Korea provides a perfect example of a 
sovereign state exercising its primacy over its own affairs. Ultimately, the IAEA can 
do little to decrease nuclear arms proliferation. North Korea's decision to withdraw 
its membership from the IAEA will not destroy the IAEA in this case because many 
other states do submit to the standards. And although the IAEA does not have the 
authority to punish North Korea for its defiance, other states which believe in the 
IAEA's function will, through sanctions and other methods, have the capacity to hurt 
North Korea's relative position. 
Conclusion 
With combined efforts, many states have submitted to regulatory policies to 
guard against, and prepare for, the potentially devastating outcome of nuclear energy 
accidents. The perception of nuclear energy is twofold. On one hand, nuclear 
technology presents itself as a viable source of energy, full of promise, and 
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environmentally safe compared to other sources. On the other hand, nuclear energy 
is associated with perilous notions of the bomb and nuclear spills. Perceptions of 
promise and peril coexist, and one has not been effective in eradicating the other. 
However, based on the perception of threat, most states' policymakers have 
submitted to regulatory policy to guard against, and prepare for, nuclear accidents. 
Based on the perception of peril, most states have agreed that it is in their best 
interest to submit to safeguards. The issue of safeguards for nuclear energy 
programs has been successful and the "nuclear energy regime" has gained 
policymaking attention because of an extremely high level of perception, knowledge, 
and a low level of competing issues to its support. 
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Chapter VI: Concluding Analysis 
This research was conducted to deepen the understanding of state cooperation 
on regulatory policies for transboundary environmental issues. It examined two 
environmental policies. The first issue involved regulatory policies to limit the global 
production of CFCs in order to decelerate the rate of ozone depletion. The second 
issue examined policies to guard against, and prepare for, nuclear accidents. Using 
a case studies method, this research employed three contributing factors, perception, 
knowledge, and affordability to examine the two environmental issues. Based on these 
structural variants, the research postulated the correlative hypothesis that regulatory 
policies for transboundary environmental issues are more likely to be enacted and 
effective when (1) policymakers' level of perceived seriousness of the issue is keen, 
(2) policymakers possess a high level of believable and substantiated information on 
the environmental issue, and (3) the state can afford to enact regulatory policies. 
The affordability factor measured the states' ability to bear the cost associated with 
enacting the regulatory policy. Thus, the affordability factor alluded to the state's 
justifiable decision to choose an environmental issue over other economic and 
political concerns. 
Succinctly, the research questions employed in this research method were: 
Did policymakers perceive a high level of threat? Was there a high degree of 
substantiated information? Were there elements influential in states' decision to 
bear the cost of enacting regulatory policy? If so, were the elements positive, as in 
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the form of financial and technical assistance, or negative, as in the form of 
sanctions? 
THE RESEARCH FOUND that the issue of enacting regulatory policy to 
decelerate anthropogenically caused ozone depletion was successful because 
policymakers perceived the issue to be serious. The issue of ozone depletion 
produced a perception of threat based largely on the scientific information which 
substantiated it. Without the corroborated scientific information, the issue would not 
have gained the policymaking attention it did. The issue of ozone depletion, minus 
the wealth of validated scientific data, would resemble the issue of global warming. 
The contributing factor of knowledge was therefore extremely important in this issue. 
Thus, knowledge as a structural variant was largely responsible for forming the 
perception of threat. 
The issue of nuclear energy accidents is different. Nuclear energy's 
perception of peril is powerful in and of itself. Therefore, knowledge, while 
important (especially to the proponents of nuclear energy arguing for its safe use), 
was not as significant as it was for the ozone issue because the perception of threat 
already existed at a level which demanded regulatory measures. 
Affordability, for both issues, was extremely important. For the ozone issue, 
the fact that substitutes were readily available was a major factor in the enactment 
of regulatory policy. Further, the fact that industrial states offered concessions and 
accommodations to LDCs, such as financial and technical assistance, made the policy 
affordable for LDCs. For the nuclear energy issue, the decision to submit to 
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safeguards did not cost the participants a significant amount because the policy is 
mostly administrative and does not require the giving up of certain practices. Table 
III serves as a visual aid to illustrate the weight given to the three contributing 
factors, perception, knowledge, and affordability in the analysis of the two case studies. 
Table III 
Analytic Conclusions based on Comparability of Two Issues 
Comparison of Structural Variants 
llllllll I I I llll!!l /I/II 
lllllllllllll 
Perception 
Knowledge 
Affordability 
Ozone Depletion 
- "Radical Environmentalist" advocate a 
complete freeze on all ozone-depleting 
substances. 
- "Conservative" groups claim that CFCs are 
not the source of ozone depletion and the 
internatioml sci~ntific community which makes 
this claim is ;':.rt of a conspiratorial plot 
designed to perpetuate their needless funding. 
- Somewhere "in the middle" is the majority of 
society (as well as policymakers) who believe 
ozone depletion poses a threat to human health 
and the environment. 
- Requires a high level of scientific 
understanding. The issue of ozone depletion 
depends largely on scientific data to "validate" 
its e:vistence. As ozone depletion is not visible 
it can easily be ignored. Further, ozone 
depletion does not produce a "crisis" and 
therefore the perception of threat does not 
prompt pclicymaking attention; therefore, 
knowledge must be convincing enough to draw 
policymaking attention. 
- Industrial states found they could bear the 
cost perhaps because (1) the U.S. spearheaded 
effort; and (2) DuPont, the leading 
manufacturer of CFCs set an example for the 
rest of the industry by switching to substitutes; 
and (3) substitutes were readily available. 
-LDC's affordability factor was influenced by 
the equitable accommodations such as (1) a ten 
year grace period; (2) technical and financial 
assistance; (1) incentives for compliance, 
sanctions for defiance. 
Nuclear Energy Disaster 
- Perception of peril is unmatched by any 
other environmental problem as it presents a 
certifiable and imminent crisis. Memories of 
Chernobyl invoke a public fear in the hearts of 
all persons. 
- Perception of promise overwhelms the fear 
as many states aspire to develop nuclear 
energy programs to boost their economic and 
political position. 
- Verifiable scientific data on nuclear disasters 
may not be necessary to persuade policymakers 
to enact regulatory policy because the 
perception of threat is sufficient to this end. 
The issue can be grasped without any 
special/scientific training. 
- Participating states decided they could afford 
the cost of submitting to IAEA regulations 
based on the belief that nuclear accidents can 
occur anywhere and therefore the preparation 
and prevention standards of the Conventions 
were found to be rational. 
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Final Comments 
As the year 2000 fast approaches, governments worldwide find their respective 
agendas replete with issues new and old. New in that Cold-War matters have fallen 
into desuetude; new in that the post World-War II configuration of the international 
system has shifted; new in that issues of the environment, human rights, and global 
concerns have outshadowed issues of isolationism, communist expansionism, and 
arms races. Old issues, though, are not far from the fore. As states are sovereign, 
self interest and necessity dictate policy. The low politics of environmental and 
social concerns are easily eclipsed by the high politics of military might when world 
politics heat up. Ultimately, states manage their low politics by seeking order up 
until the point it is necessary for them to seek power.244 While issues of security 
will always predomiH~te, there is much to be said for the possibilities of the 
reconfigured Post Cold-War state system, such as the hope for cooperative efforts 
which could have never occurred in a bi-polar system. Perhaps today, issues are not 
perceived solely in zero-sum terms. This change in perception may allow for states 
to eschew their dominant strategy of independent decision making, in certain 
situations, to opt to participate in a joint effort, based on the belief that a collective 
venture will yield a preferred gain. Arguably, during the time of the Cold-War, 
states would not eschew their independent strategy, based purely on principle, 
regardless whether or not a more preferred gain could be obtained collectively. 
During the time of the Cold-War, a contest of ideologies left little to no room for 
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compromise and cooperation; every action was viewed strictly as a win or a loss. The 
United States and Soviet Union's respective belief systems feared that ideas had 
consequences, and to yield even in the slightest, was to give the adversary more 
leverage and opportunity to impose its views. Thus, a regime, as an institutionalized 
arrangement used to structure state interaction would not likely be efficacious nor 
possible during the ultra-suspicious times of the Cold-War. Suffice it to say that 
environmental issues may be more likely to attract regulatory policies from states and 
governments today, in a state system amenable to order. During this time of order, 
states have confronted many environmental problems. Reactive policies are slowly 
becoming proactive policies as many states are taking precautionary practices and 
acting in foresight to protect the environment. 
Fu tu re Research 
A future project may be to expand on the research method used in this study, 
emphasizing the strnctural variants perception, knowledge, and affordability. By 
increasing the number of case studies to at least twenty, the analyst would be able 
to conduct a quantitative analysis to determine if certain states stand out as more 
"environmentally conscious" than others. If certain states actively support 
transboundary environmental regulatory policies more than others, it would be 
interesting to ascertain whether or not these states have ongoing relationships with 
their neighboring states. In the language of this research it would be interesting to 
note whether these states exhibit a high level of diffuse reciprocity and regime 
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participation. This research has dealt with the successful formation of two such 
regimes. Becaus,~ these regimes are only recently formed, it is too early to judge 
their success at implementation. Future research will better be able to judge if these 
regimes are truly effective in overcoming the two serious environmental issues 
discussed herein. For now, we can only hope that they will be. 
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